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Abstract 
This thesis combines three empirical essays in population economics. The first 
chapter is a collaborative work with Professor Christopher Carpenter and Professor 
Jeff Frank. In this chapter we examine the earnings differences between sexual 
minorities and heterosexual individuals. Most prior work on labour market outcomes 
associated with a minority sexual orientation either lacks good information on labour 
earnings or only studies same-sex couples.  We remedy this gap using a large 
individual level dataset from the United Kingdom that allows us to measure both 
constructs. We find a large lesbian earnings premium and gay male penalty in 
couples-based comparisons – similar to previous work – but no meaningful 
differential when we restrict attention to singles. The second chapter investigates the 
impact of unemployment on birth rates in England. It sheds light on the mixed 
results in the existing literature, particularly showing how the relationship between 
unemployment and fertility rates varies across demographic subgroups. This chapter 
also contributes to the existing literature by tackling the issue of endogeneity using a 
Bartik-style instrumental variable approach. The results of this study suggest that 
female unemployment tends to increase births, whereas male unemployment has the 
opposite effect. The third chapter explores the effects of house prices on fertility 
using a new instrumental variable strategy, exploiting exogenous variation in house 
prices induced by planning restrictions. Existing studies find a positive effect of 
house prices on fertility rate at the aggregate level. I show that evidence from a 
country with a highly regulated housing market suggests otherwise and the net effect 
is negative. I also find that home owners’ birth rates respond positively to house 
price increases, whereas the opposite is true for renters. The estimates for those aged 
20-29 imply that the negative effect of house prices on renters’ birth rate is much 
larger than those implied by the older age group. In contrast, the results for those 
aged 30-44 show that the overall housing wealth effects are larger than those found in 
the 20-29 age band, and the home owner results are mainly driven by the older age 
group.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This thesis consists of three empirical essays in population economics. The second 
chapter investigates the relationship between sexual orientation and labor market 
earnings. Most prior work on this topic has relied either on individual level surveys 
with small samples of sexual minorities or has used large samples of same-sex couples. 
This chapter uses a large individual level dataset from the United Kingdom and 
measures both constructs.  It replicates the well-documented lesbian advantage and 
gay male penalty in couples-based comparisons but shows that these effects are absent 
in similarly specified models of non-partnered workers.  This suggests both that 
couples-based samples overstate the true earnings differences attributable to a 
minority sexual orientation and that household specialization plays an important role 
in the lesbian earnings advantage.  It also shows that there is no significant lesbian 
advantage or gay male penalty in London.  Finally, there is a robust evidence that 
bisexual men earn significantly less than otherwise similar heterosexual men.  The 
detailed discussion on how the effects reconcile with theories of specialization and 
discrimination has been provided. This chapter is forthcoming in the Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review (ILR Review). 
The third chapter re-investigates the causal effects of local unemployment on 
fertility. It argues that contradicting results in the existing empirical research may have 
Introduction 
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arisen due to a neglect of sub-demographic differences and failure to recognize 
endogeneity. It hypothesizes that male and female unemployment will have different 
impacts on fertility across subgroups of the population. Drawing on the UK Labor 
Force Survey and the Birth Statistics data from the Office for National Statistics, the 
results of this study suggest that female unemployment tends to increase births, 
whereas male unemployment has the opposite effect. More importantly, the reported 
results indicate the unemployment and fertility relation exhibits strong variation across 
demographic subgroups. Lastly, a persistent countercyclical fertility pattern is also 
documented at the county level. This chapter is published in the B.E. Journal of 
Economic Analysis and Policy. 
Finally, the fourth chapter examines the effects of house prices on fertility rates 
using a new instrumental variable strategy, exploiting exogenous variation in house 
prices induced by planning restrictions. Existing studies find a positive effect of house 
prices on fertility rate at the aggregate level. I show that evidence from a country with 
a highly regulated housing market suggests otherwise and the net effect is negative. 
Using data from English counties, the instrumental variable estimates indicate that: a 
10 per cent increase in house prices leads to a 2.8 per cent increase in births among 
owners and a 4.9 per cent decrease in births among renters. Once calculated at the 
mean home ownership rate the net effect is a 1.3 per cent fall in birth rates. In addition, 
I document that the positive home owners effect is primarily driven by the older cohort 
and the negative price effect among renters is mainly driven by those aged 20-29. A 
further assessment of house prices and fertility nexus reveals that these effects vary by 
regions and demographic subgroups. This chapter is released through the working 
paper series of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), No. 
192. 
Sexual Orientation and Earnings: New Evidence from the UK 
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Chapter 2 
Sexual Orientation and Earnings: New Evidence from the UK 
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2.1 Introduction 
A growing literature in labor economics examines earnings differences between sexual 
minorities and heterosexuals using population representative datasets.  To identify 
sexual minorities, researchers have used either: 1) individual level data with self-reports 
of a gay, lesbian, or bisexual orientation (Carpenter 2005, 2008a; Plug and Berkhout 
2004, and others) or same-sex sexual behavior (Badgett 1995, Black et al. 2003, and 
others); or 2) couples-based data where sexual orientation is inferred through same-sex 
living arrangements and the identification of relationships between individual members 
of the household (Allegretto and Arthur 2001, Arabsheibani et al. 2004, Antecol et al. 
2008, and others).1  Two stylized facts have emerged from couples-based investigations: 
1) men in cohabiting same-sex couples earn significantly less than men in different-sex
relationships; and 2) women in cohabiting same-sex couples earn significantly more 
than women in different-sex relationships.  In contrast, studies with individual level 
sexual orientation information generally (but not always) display smaller or insignificant 
earnings differences. 
Because sexual minorities are only a small part of the overall population, the 
literature has struggled with a tradeoff between representativeness and sample size.  
Couples-based datasets such as population Censuses in Canada, the United States, and 
the United Kingdom yield very large samples of same-sex couples but do not identify 
the sexual identity of non-partnered individuals.  In contrast, datasets with individual 
level information on sexual orientation or sexual behavior (e.g. the General Social 
Survey or the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey) have generally been 
1 The limitations of these alternative methods for identifying sexual orientation in large datasets have been 
discussed at length elsewhere (see, for example, Carpenter and Gates 2008). 
Sexual Orientation and Earnings: New Evidence from the UK 
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much smaller in size, yielding very small numbers of sexual minorities.  The few studies 
with individual level information on sexual orientation and reasonably large samples of 
sexual minorities have been limited to single states (e.g., Carpenter 2005), limited to 
young adults (e.g., Plug and Berkhout 2004, Sabia 2014), or lacked information on labor 
market earnings (Carpenter 2008a).  As a result, it has been difficult to know whether 
differences in estimated earnings effects of a minority sexual orientation in different 
studies are due to differences in the samples, populations, or outcomes.  Relatedly, it has 
been difficult to disentangle alternative theories underlying sexual orientation-based 
differences in labor market outcomes (e.g., specialization versus discrimination).2 
We overcome these challenges by using confidential versions of the 2012-2014 
UK Integrated Household Surveys (IHS) to which high quality labor market earnings 
data from the country’s Annual Population Survey have been linked.  These data allow 
us to identify large samples of sexual minority individuals – over 2,500 self-identified 
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals (LGB) – through responses to a direct question about 
sexual orientation.  Our sample is considerably larger than other studies using individual 
level sexual orientation information in the UK (Uhrig 2015 and Bryson 2014, described 
below), and indeed ours is the first population representative dataset with information on 
both sexual orientation and earnings for a large sample of adults from a single country.  
Moreover, our IHS data permit us to identify not only individual level sexual orientation 
but also same-sex partnerships.  This means we can directly test for how measurement 
of sexual orientation (i.e., individual level self-reports versus same-sex partnerships) is 
                                                
2 Klawitter’s (2015) meta-analysis of studies on this topic published between 1995 and 2012 showed that 
the sample size of sexual minorities and the measure of sexual orientation (couple-status versus sexual 
identity or sexual behavior) were both significantly related to the estimated earnings difference associated 
with a minority sexual orientation. 
Sexual Orientation and Earnings: New Evidence from the UK 
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related to earnings differences between sexual minorities and heterosexuals.  It also 
allows us to comment more directly on the possible explanations for earnings 
differentials.  For example, the returns to specialization within the household should 
accrue to partnered rather than single individuals.  In contrast, there is no clear 
prediction from economic theory on why partnered or non-partnered sexual minorities 
should suffer greater or lesser discrimination (though it could be that sexual orientation 
for partnered sexual minorities is more observable to employers, an issue we discuss 
below). 
We show that having data on both partnered and non-partnered sexual minorities 
is substantively important.  After controlling for observable determinants of earnings 
(such as education, location, and family structure), we find a positive and statistically 
significant earnings differential for partnered lesbians compared to partnered 
heterosexual women but no earnings differential for non-partnered lesbians compared 
with similarly situated non-partnered heterosexual women.  We find a negative and 
marginally significant earnings penalty for partnered gay men compared to partnered 
heterosexual men but no earnings differential for non-partnered gay men compared with 
similarly situated non-partnered heterosexual men.  Taking together the overall 
population of both partnered and non-partnered individuals, we find that the earnings 
difference associated with a gay sexual orientation for men is near zero, while the 
associated population-based earnings difference among women associated with a lesbian 
orientation is a premium of about 5.5 percent and is statistically significant. 
The different results found for partnered and non-partnered sexual minorities, 
compared to heterosexuals of the same partnership status, are consistent with models of 
Sexual Orientation and Earnings: New Evidence from the UK 
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specialization within the household.  Traditional heterosexual households specialize in 
market and non-market work, with disproportionate market activity done by the male 
partner.  Even if same sex partnerships have the same degree of specialization, it will 
not be associated with gender.  Everything else including degree of specialization being 
equal, the average partnered gay male (lesbian) will earn less (more) than the average 
partnered heterosexual male (female).  This effect does not hold when comparing single 
gay men and lesbians to single heterosexuals, since there is no household specialization. 
In addition to comparing partnered and non-partnered sexual minorities, we 
establish several other interesting facts about the sub-groups experiencing sexual 
orientation differences in earnings.  The lesbian earnings advantage is driven by women 
without a university degree and by women who live outside of London, not by a 
metropolitan elite.  There is a significant gay male earnings penalty in samples of older 
men (45-64 year olds), consistent with possible historical discrimination against gay 
men.  We also find that bisexual men are estimated to earn significantly less than 
otherwise similar heterosexual men in the private sector but not in the public sector.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 reviews the relevant literature on 
sexual orientation-based differences in earnings.  Section 2.3 describes the special 
license of the UK IHS data and the estimation framework.  Section 2.4 presents the 
results, and Section 2.5 offers a discussion and concludes. 
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2.2 Literature Review 
Our study contributes to the literature on sexual orientation and earnings among adults 
that uses population representative datasets to identify sexual minorities.3  Badgett 
(1995) pioneered studies on this topic by identifying sexual minorities using information 
on reports of same-sex sexual behavior in the General Social Surveys (GSS), finding a 
significant gay male earnings penalty and a lesbian earnings advantage.  Several follow-
up studies found broadly similar results using behavior-based measures in the GSS and 
other data (Black et al. 2003; Blandford 2003; Carpenter 2007a). 
There is less consistency in results across studies using datasets that identify 
sexual minorities through direct questions about sexual orientation identity (as opposed 
to same-sex sexual behavior).  Carpenter (2008a) examined data from a large health 
survey in Canada and found that gay men had significantly lower personal incomes than 
otherwise similar heterosexual men while lesbians had significantly higher personal 
incomes than heterosexual women.  Carpenter (2005) studied adults in California and 
found no evidence of significant earnings differentials for gay men or lesbians.  Uhrig 
3 We do not review here correspondence studies that consistently show evidence of hiring discrimination 
against sexual minorities.  For the US, Tilscik (2011) found strong evidence of discrimination against 
fictitious applicants who appeared to be gay.  Similar experiments in other countries have also returned 
evidence of differential treatment against lesbians in Austria (Weichselbaumer 2003); against gay men in 
Greece (Drydakis 2009); and against gay men and lesbians in Sweden (Ahmed et al. 2013).  For 
tractability, we also restrict attention here to studies of prime age adults similar to the sample we study 
here.  A handful of studies have examined data on college students or young adults.  Plug and Berkhout 
(2004) studied young people in the Netherlands and found very small earnings differences associated with 
a gay or lesbian orientation.  Carpenter (2008b) examined young women in Australia and found that 
young lesbians had significantly lower personal incomes than similarly situated young heterosexual 
women.  Sabia (2014, 2015) studied young adults in the US from the National Longitudinal Study of 
Adolescent Health (Add Health) and found that young gay men earn significantly less than young 
heterosexual men and that this difference cannot be explained by numerous controls for family and 
individual level heterogeneity.  In contrast, young lesbians did not earn significantly different wages than 
otherwise similar young heterosexual women in the young adult sample.  Finally, although we focus only 
on studies using large samples of data from representative surveys, it is worth noting that one study 
provides evidence on sexual orientation and salary among UK academics.  Frank (2006) finds no evidence 
that gay or lesbian academics in the UK experience salary differences compared to otherwise similar 
heterosexual academics, although he does find differences in promotions. 
Sexual Orientation and Earnings: New Evidence from the UK 
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(2015) used data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) collected in 
2011-2012 and found a statistically significant bisexual male earnings penalty of about 
12 percent and a statistically significant lesbian earnings premium of about 12 percent, 
with no earnings differences experienced by gay men or bisexual women.  Bryson 
(2014) used data from the UK’s 2011 Workplace and Employment Relations Study 
(WERS) and found that bisexual men earn significantly less than similarly situated 
heterosexual men, while gay men and lesbians do not in general earn different wages 
than heterosexuals.   
To gain larger sample sizes, much recent work on this topic has used data from 
population Censuses or administrative register data that identify sexual minorities 
through same-sex couples.  This work was pioneered by a series of papers that used the 
1990 Decennial Census to study same-sex unmarried partner couples in the United 
States (Black et al. 2000, Klawitter and Flatt 1998, Allegretto and Arthur 2001).  
Klawitter and Flatt (1998) and Allegretto and Arthur (2001) both found that men in 
same-sex couples in the 1990 Census earned significantly less than similarly qualified 
men in different-sex couples.  Clain and Leppel (2001) used data from the 1990 US 
Census to show that women in same-sex partnerships earned significantly more than 
women in different-sex partnerships.  Jepsen (2007) and Antecol et al. (2008) both used 
the 2000 US Census to further explore couples-based wage gaps.  Jepsen (2007) found a 
significant lesbian premium with evidence that this premium was not driven by 
household specialization.  Antecol et al. (2008) found a lesbian premium and gay male 
penalty with evidence that the premium might be due to human capital differences while 
the penalty might be due to discrimination.  International studies have also examined 
Sexual Orientation and Earnings: New Evidence from the UK 
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sexual orientation-based differences in earnings using couples datasets.  Arabsheibani et 
al. (2004, 2005) used the UK Labour Force Survey and found a couples-based gay male 
penalty and lesbian premium, while Ahmed and Hammarstedt (2010) used Swedish 
register data to identify couples who had formalized their relationship with the 
government and found a gay male earnings penalty. 
Studies that infer sexuality from partnership are important since they tend to 
have much larger sample sizes than the existing individual-level samples in the 
literature.  However, this work begs the question of whether or not partnered sexual 
minorities are representative of the overall sexual minority population.  Carpenter 
(2008a) had a sufficiently large Canadian data set to provide a first answer to that 
question.  That study found much larger differences in partner-based comparisons of 
total personal income versus population-based comparisons.  However, total personal 
income may be misleading since it includes significant government transfer income.  
Transfers based on marital status or the presence of children in the household are likely 
to be correlated with sexual orientation.  In the current study, we have data on labor 
market earnings and provide the first country-level study of sexual orientation and labor 
market earnings for a large population-representative sample of adults using large 
samples of sexual minority individuals. 
2.3 Data Description and Empirical Approach 
Our data come from a special license of confidential versions of the 2012-2014 UK 
Integrated Household Survey (IHS) with Annual Population Survey (APS) earnings 
variables linked to the individual records.  The IHS is a large, representative household 
Sexual Orientation and Earnings: New Evidence from the UK 
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survey of UK residents similar to the March Current Population Survey in the United 
States.  Approximately 350,000 individuals are sampled in each wave of the IHS.  For 
our purposes, the key feature of these data is that the IHS asked respondents a direct 
question about their sexual orientation.  Most studies in the literature on sexual 
orientation and earnings have relied on indirect methods for identifying sexual 
minorities, such as same-sex sexual behavior (as in some public health surveys) or, more 
commonly, the presence of a cohabiting same-sex partner (such as the UKLFS as used 
in Arabsheibani et al. 2005, 2004).  Since people who do not have sex can still identify 
as sexual minorities, and since non-partnered sexual minorities may have different 
outcomes than cohabiting partnered sexual minorities, our individual level data on self-
reported sexual orientation are preferred as a more comprehensive sample of the overall 
population of LGB individuals.  Importantly, we also have information on which of the 
self-reported sexual minority individuals are in partnerships. 
The IHS contains both a telephone and a face-to-face survey mode.  In the 
telephone mode, respondents age 16 and older are asked “I will now read out a list of 
terms people sometimes use to describe how they think of themselves. 
(INTERVIEWER: read list to end without pausing.  Note that ‘Heterosexual or Straight’ 
is one option; ‘Gay or Lesbian’ is one option.) 1. Heterosexual or Straight, 2. Gay or 
Lesbian, 3. Bisexual, 4. Other (Spontaneous DK/Refusal).  As I read the list again please 
say ‘yes’ when you hear the option that best describes how you think of yourself. 
(INTERVIEWER: Pause briefly after each option during second reading).”  In the face 
to face interviews, participants age 16 and older were shown a card that had the terms 
printed next to a number (such as “27. Heterosexual/Straight”).  Individuals were then 
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asked “Which of the options on this card best describes how you think of yourself?  
Please just read out the number next to the description.”  Notably, sexual minorities did 
not have to verbalize the words “gay”, “lesbian”, or “bisexual” to indicate their sexual 
orientation in either the telephone or face to face survey modes, which presumably 
reduced potential stigma.4  Approximately 1.4-1.7 percent of individuals 16 and older 
self-identified as gay, lesbian, or bisexual in each wave of the IHS, which is similar to 
other large population-based surveys in the UK, US, and Canada (Joloza et al. 2010). 
Individuals are asked about their employment status as well as their gross weekly 
pay before deductions.5  In addition to the critical questions on sexual orientation and 
earnings, the IHS includes standard demographic characteristics such as sex, age, 
race/ethnicity, educational attainment, partnership/marital status, and the presence of 
children in the household.  We restrict attention to individuals age 25 and older to focus 
on individuals most likely to have completed their education.6 
We first estimate the relationship between sexual orientation and employment by 
estimating linear probability models separately by sex and partnership status.7  These 
models take the form: 
(1) EMPLOYEDi = a + b1Xi + b2(GAY/LESBIAN)i + b3(BISEXUAL)i + ei 
4 In our empirical models below we include a dummy variable for interviews that were conducted face-to-
face.  The sexual orientation question was not asked in cases of ‘proxy’ interviews where a different 
member of the household provided the information.  Forty-four percent of interviews were conducted 
either by proxy or for respondents under age 16.  We exclude these observations without sexual 
orientation information. 
5 In results not reported but available upon request, our main results are robust to excluding small number 
of observations (less than a tenth of one percent of the full sample) with earnings less than £20 and more 
than £7500 per week. 
6 In results not reported but available upon request, we found that lowering our minimum age in the 
sample to 18 does not meaningfully change the results. 
7 Partnership is based on a dummy variable indicating the person is in any type of partnership (marriage, 
registered civil union, or a cohabiting partnership not officially recognized by the government). 
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where EMPLOYED is an indicator variable for being employed or being full-time 
employed, depending on the model.  X is a vector of demographic and job variables that 
(depending on the model) include: age and its square; education dummies (degree 
levels, higher education qualification below degree level, A-levels, O-levels); race 
dummies (white, black, Asian, mixed race, other race); location dummies (London, 
England excluding London, Scotland, and Northern Ireland); and dummy variables for 
the presence of children in the household (any child <5, any child at least age 5).  Note 
that in this model the relevant excluded category for sexual orientation is composed of 
individuals who report a heterosexual orientation.  In all models we separately include 
dummy variables for people who reported ‘other’ to the sexual orientation question, who 
refused to provide a response, or who reported ‘don’t know’ (although we do not report 
the coefficients in the results tables).8  We also include in all models a dummy variable 
for interviews performed face-to-face.  The error term e is assumed to be well behaved, 
and we estimate standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity. 
To assess the relationship between sexual orientation and earnings we estimate 
earnings models separately for males and females and for partnered and non-partnered 
individuals, among the sample of full-time workers.  These models take the form: 
(2) LOG EARNINGSi = a + b1Xi + b2(GAY/LESBIAN)i + b3(BISEXUAL)i + ei 
where all variables are as described above.9 
8 Appendix Table 2.1 reports demographic characteristics for individuals who did not provide a valid 
response to the sexual orientation question. 
9 We also estimated models where we included job characteristics (a private sector dummy, establishment 
size dummies, industry dummies, and occupation dummies), though a challenge in doing so is that these 
variables may be channels through which labor market discrimination operates, and thus it does not make 
sense to control for them in an attempt to distinguish discrimination from specialization.  Prior work has 
demonstrated strong evidence of occupational sorting by sexual orientation (Antecol et al. 2008).   
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2.4 Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for demographic and employment 
characteristics from the IHS data broken down by self-reported sexual orientation and 
gender.10  Self-identified gay men and bisexual men (compared to heterosexual men) are 
significantly more likely to have a university degree, less likely to be partnered, less 
likely to have children in the household, and more likely to live in London.  Gay men 
(but not bisexual men) are less likely to belong to a racial/ethnic minority and more 
likely to live in England (rather than Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland).  In the raw 
data, gay men have significantly higher average weekly earnings than heterosexual men, 
while bisexual men have significantly lower average weekly earnings.  There is no 
significant differential in full-time employment between heterosexual men, gay men and 
bisexual men.  
Self-identified lesbians (compared to heterosexual women) are significantly 
more likely to have a university degree, less likely to belong to a racial/ethnic minority, 
less likely to have children in the household, and more likely to live in England and 
specifically in London.  Notably, the partnership and presence of children differences 
between lesbians and heterosexual women are substantially smaller than those between 
gay men and heterosexual men.  In the raw data, lesbians are significantly more likely to 
be full time workers and have higher average weekly earnings than heterosexual 
women.  Bisexual women are significantly more likely than heterosexual women to 
10 We use the subsample of the IHS for which we have earnings information. 
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have a university degree, more likely to be partnered, and more likely to be full-time 
workers.11 
 
Full-time employment 
In Table 2.2 we examine the relationship between individual characteristics – 
including sexual orientation – and full-time employment (the likelihood of any 
employment is examined in Appendix Table 2.2) for men (columns 1 and 2) and women 
(columns 3 and 4).12  We estimate models separately for the full sample in the top panel 
(combining partnered and non-partnered people and including a control for being in a 
partnership), for non-partnered individuals in the middle panel, and for partnered 
individuals in the bottom panel.  Each column shows coefficients on the gay/lesbian and 
bisexual indicator variables; the odd numbered columns report estimates from models 
that only control for sexual orientation, while the even numbered columns add all the 
individual demographic characteristics (including residential location and presence of 
children).  In column 2 of Table 2.2 we find that gay (bisexual) men are 4.5 (11.9) 
percentage points less likely to be working full-time than otherwise similar heterosexual 
men.  Notably, this difference for gay men is driven by the partnered sample.  Partnered 
                                                
11 It is worth noting that our estimates of the proportion of self-identified sexual minorities who report 
being partnered are independently interesting contributions to the literature since very few datasets have 
had information on sexual orientation at the individual level, particularly on a large national scale.  Table 
2.1 shows that a larger proportion of lesbians reports being partnered compared to gay men (69 percent of 
lesbians versus nearly 50 percent of gay men).  These patterns – that the lesbian partnership rate is very 
similar to the partnership rate of heterosexual women and that the gay male partnership rate is 
substantially lower than the partnership rate of heterosexual men – were also found for adults in California 
(Carpenter and Gates 2008).  Black et al. (2007) find a similar pattern using data from the GSS that 
identify sexual minorities from responses about same-sex sexual behavior.  Our data also suggest that 
bisexual men have partnership rates (51.7 percent) that are more similar to those of gay men than to those 
of heterosexual men, while those of bisexual women (73.4 percent) are slightly higher than those of either 
lesbians or heterosexual women. 
12 Full-time workers are defined as employees working more than 30 paid hours per week (or 25 or more 
for the teaching professions). 
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gay men are 6.1 percentage points less likely to be working full time than otherwise 
similar partnered heterosexual men.  In contrast, the difference for bisexual men is 
driven primarily in the non-partnered sample, where non-partnered bisexual men are 
11.7 percentage points less likely to be working full time than otherwise similar non-
partnered heterosexual men.  These patterns are qualitatively identical for the analyses 
of the likelihood of any employment in Appendix Table 2.2. 
The results for women in Column 4 of Table 2.2 for full-time employment show 
that lesbians are 8.2 percentage points more likely to be working full-time than 
otherwise similar heterosexual women, while bisexual women are 5.4 percentage points 
less likely to be working full-time.  As with gay males, the lesbian difference in full-
time employment (although of opposite sign to that for gay males) is predominantly 
driven by the partnered sample.  Partnered lesbians are 15.4 percentage points more 
likely to be working full time than similar partnered heterosexual women.  What differs 
for lesbians compared to gay males is that the differential reverses when we look at the 
likelihood that lesbians have any employment (as opposed to full-time employment) in 
the sample of partnered women after controlling for observables (see Appendix Table 
2.2).  This arises since heterosexual women in partnerships are more likely than lesbians 
to engage in part-time work. 
These results are consistent with the model of specialization in traditional 
heterosexual partnerships.  Partially, this may be the result of a substantially lower 
likelihood of children in the household for both gay men and lesbians, compared to their 
heterosexual counterparts (Table 2.1).  This may reduce the need for partnered gay men 
to work full time in the same way as partnered heterosexual men.  Conversely, lesbians 
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on average have fewer childcare responsibilities than heterosexual women and can 
remain in full-time employment. (Black et al. 2007) 
 
Earnings 
Table 2.3 presents estimates of the association between minority sexual 
orientation and earnings among full-time workers.  We focus on full-time workers to be 
consistent with most of the prior literature; we consider all workers in Table 2.4.  The 
format of Table 2.3 follows Table 2.2 in that the top panel shows results for the full 
sample (combining partnered and non-partnered people and including a control for 
being in a partnership), the middle panel examines non-partnered individuals, and the 
bottom panel examines partnered individuals.  Columns 1 and 2 present results for men, 
while columns 3 and 4 present results for women; the odd numbered columns include 
only the sexual orientation variables and year dummies, while the even numbered 
columns add all the demographic and family characteristics. 
The results in Table 2.3 are striking.  For all comparisons without controls for 
demographic characteristics in columns 1 and 3, we find that gay men and lesbians earn 
significantly more than heterosexual men and women, a finding that was previewed in 
Table 2.1.  More importantly, once we control for education, age, and other 
characteristics in columns 2 and 4, we find important differences by partnership status.  
In the bottom panel of columns 2 and 4 comparing only partnered sexual minorities to 
otherwise similar partnered heterosexuals who are full-time workers – as is common in 
most of the prior literature – we find the usual pattern that partnered gay men earn 
significantly less than otherwise similar partnered heterosexual men, while partnered 
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lesbians earn significantly more than otherwise similar partnered heterosexual women. 
In contrast, the middle panel of columns 2 and 4 for non-partnered individuals returns 
much smaller coefficients on the gay/lesbian indicator variables that are not statistically 
significant.  The results for the full sample in the top panel of columns 2 and 4 confirm 
that the overall earnings effects of a gay or lesbian orientation are smaller than those 
implied by the partner-based comparisons, and only the estimate for lesbians is 
statistically significant in the combined sample.  We also find a bisexual male earnings 
penalty relative to similarly situated heterosexual men that is approximately equal in 
partnered and non-partnered comparisons; in contrast, there is no earnings difference for 
bisexual women compared to otherwise similar heterosexual women, except for a 
marginally significant bisexual female earnings penalty among non-partnered 
individuals.13   
In Tables 2.4a/4b and 2.5a/5b we report the sexual orientation coefficients in log 
earnings regressions for various subsamples, following the baseline specification in 
columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.3 for males and females, respectively.  In addition to the 
estimates of the fully saturated model for full-time workers (reprinted in column 1 of 
Tables 2.4a/4b and 2.5a/5b for comparison purposes), we show results for samples that 
include all workers (including part-time workers) in column 2 of Tables 2.4a/4b.  These 
models also include a control for being a full-time worker.  For men, adding part-time 
13 Appendix Table 2.3 reports the values of all the coefficients in the fully saturated model (columns 2
and 4 in Table 2.3).  Appendix Tables 2.4 and 2.5 (for men and women, respectively) show that these 
same basic patterns are robust to controlling additionally for sector of employment, establishment size, 
and industry of employment (either alone or in combination).  Occupation controls do matter in one 
instance, however: the lesbian premium for non-partnered individuals only obtains after accounting for 
unrestricted occupation controls; including controls for establishment size, private sector, and industry 
dummies alone or in combination does not return a significant lesbian premium in the non-partnered 
sample.  This confirms prior work that occupational sorting is important for understanding sexual 
orientation-based differences in labor market outcomes (Plug et al. 2014). 
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workers makes the negative gay male earnings effect become statistically significant, 
primarily due to an increase in the estimated negative earnings effect of a gay 
orientation for non-partnered men when part-time workers are added to the model.  For 
women, the original patterns in column 4 of Table 2.3 remain, though the magnitudes on 
the lesbian coefficient are much larger in magnitude. 
These earnings results shed light on the differential results in the literature when 
the sample is the full population of self-identified sexual minorities compared to 
samples that only identify those sexual minority individuals who are in partnerships.  By 
having a large sample with both individual-level self-identification and partnership 
status, our results directly confirm that the significant earnings differentials are 
predominantly observed in partner-based samples. 
 
Additional earnings effects 
Columns 3 and 4 of Tables 2.4a/4b examine earnings differences when 
separating the sample by residence in London.  Prior work has found this to be an 
important feature for understanding earnings of gay men (Arabsheibani et al. 2004).  
While there are many differences between London and the rest of the United Kingdom, 
one of the most salient in this context is that there is likely to be less discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation in London.  Table 2.1 indicated London is a 
disproportionately popular residence choice for gay and bisexual men and lesbian and 
bisexual women.  We find in column 3 of Table 2.4a that the estimated coefficient on 
the gay male indicator is positive in sign (suggesting a gay male premium in London), 
though it is not statistically significant.  In contrast, we estimate in column 4 that gay 
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men outside of London experience a significant wage penalty, and again this penalty is 
larger in partner-based samples.  For bisexual men we estimate sizable earnings 
penalties both inside and outside of London, though the bisexual male coefficients are 
not statistically different from each other in the London versus non-London 
comparisons.  These London-based patterns for men are interesting, as one could 
imagine that gay men would earn significantly less in London to compensate them for 
the city’s more progressive attitudes.  Instead, it appears that gay men with higher 
unobservable attributes may choose to move to London or alternatively there is less of a 
taste for discrimination in London.14  
For women in Table 2.4b we also find an intriguing difference when we stratify 
by residence in London.  Specifically, we find that the entire lesbian earnings advantage 
experienced by lesbians is found outside of London, with much smaller and statistically 
insignificant lesbian coefficients in London.  Moreover, the London lesbian differential 
is the exact opposite of the finding for gay men (who are estimated to do systematically 
better than their heterosexual male counterparts only inside London).  We find no strong 
difference in bisexual female earnings differences by residence inside or outside of 
London.   
Columns 5 and 6 of Tables 2.4a/4b examine earnings effects of a minority sexual 
orientation for full-time workers separately by public vs. private sector of employment.  
This margin is potentially interesting since one might expect there to be stronger 
antidiscrimination protections in the public sector.  In the UK, the public sector has a 
                                                
14 The disproportionately high representation of gay men and lesbians in London could also be related to 
their lower likelihood of having children in the household in a way that interacts strongly with differential 
returns to household specialization for sexual minorities compared to heterosexuals.  Black et al. (2002) 
argue that the spatial distribution of gay and lesbian couples into disproportionately expensive, high-
amenity locations reflects their differential consumption of non-child goods.  
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‘positive duty’ to address discrimination which goes beyond the relatively passive 
requirement upon the private sector not to discriminate.15  Despite this, we find no 
meaningful differences in earnings effects of a gay sexual orientation for men in Table 
2.4a by sector of employment.  There is, however, some indirect evidence from columns 
5 and 6 of Table 2.4a about possible discrimination against bisexual men: while bisexual 
men suffer an extremely large and statistically significant earnings penalty in the private 
sector, the estimated penalty in the public sector is small and insignificant. We 
acknowledge that the presence of a bisexual male earnings penalty and the absence of a 
gay male earnings penalty is puzzling and on its face is difficult to reconcile with simple 
theories of discrimination.  For women, we do estimate a larger lesbian premium for 
public sector workers, though the estimate for the public sector sample is not statistically 
distinguishable from the insignificant lesbian coefficient in the private sector sample in 
column 5 of the top row of Table 2.4b. 
 Tables 2.5a and 2.5b present further results by demographic group, and the 
format of these tables follows that of Tables 2.4a/4b (including the fact that we reprint 
the full sample estimates in column 1).  Columns 2 and 3 of Tables 2.5a/5b present 
results for 25-45 and 46-65 year old full-time workers, respectively; columns 4 and 5 
present results for full-time workers with at least some university education versus those 
without any university education. 
 Results in Table 2.5a for men return evidence that older gay men experience an 
earnings penalty relative to similarly situated older heterosexual men.  For women in 
Table 2.5b we document that the lesbian earnings premium is much larger and stronger 
                                                
15 Prior work on different UK data than we use here shows that lesbians earn relatively higher wages at 
employers with explicit antidiscrimination protections compared to those without (Bryson 2014). 
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in the sample of women without any university education.  This is interesting since it 
has been hypothesized that highly educated sexual minorities might be more able to 
avoid some of the negative earnings effects of discrimination in the labor market; the 
fact that the lesbian advantage is observed in the relatively lower educated sample is less 
consistent with a simple taste-based discrimination explanation. 
 
 
Effects by head of household status 
 Our argument on specialization and the lesbian (gay male) earnings premium 
(penalty) was based upon the gendered nature of heterosexual household specialization.  
It would hold if lesbian and gay male households specialized to the same degree as 
heterosexual households.  However, if there are diminishing returns to market 
specialization, then if an average lesbian or gay male household specializes less (more) 
than an average heterosexual household, the premium would be increased (lessened) or 
the penalty would be decreased (increased).  Of course, it is of interest in its own right 
as to whether specialization in lesbian or gay partnerships is less than in traditional 
heterosexual households.   
We use information in the IHS to determine whether an individual in a 
partnership is a ‘household head’ or ‘not a household head’.16  If gay men and lesbians 
                                                
16 The IHS data include a measure for ‘household reference person’ (HRP).  The Office of National 
Statistics defines the HRP as “the person who is the main owner, renter or in some other way responsible 
for the accommodation, and who has the highest income (and in some circumstances who has the highest 
income and is oldest).  The rationale for this definition is that the main householder is the person who 
exerts the most influence on the household’s living patterns and circumstances.”  This variable indicated 
that 44.4% of partnered heterosexual women were the HRP in their household.  We are skeptical that this 
proportion accurately describes the conceptual construct we are interested in, and the HRP also has the 
problem that it defines household head status using earnings explicitly (and our outcome of interest is 
earnings).  For these reasons, we chose to define an alternative version of ‘household head’ in the 
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in partnerships specialize less than similarly situated heterosexuals in partnerships, we 
would expect that the gay male penalty and the lesbian premium would be relatively 
evenly distributed between sexual minorities who are household heads and sexual 
minorities who are not household heads. 
We test this hypothesis with the following model estimated separately by sex: 
(3) LOG EARNINGSi = a + b1Xi + b2(Gay/Lesbian and Household Head)i + 
b3(Gay/Lesbian and Not Household Head)i + ei 
where the sample consists of all partnered individuals in full-time work.  Note that we 
also included dummies for the other sexual orientation categories (bisexual, ‘other’, and 
‘don’t know’), but we do not report their coefficients.  The main comparison group is all 
heterosexual individuals, as we did not want to compare primary earner lesbians to 
primary earner heterosexuals for the concern that partnered heterosexual women who 
are household heads are likely to be extremely positively selected, and thus the 
comparison between household head heterosexual women and household head lesbians 
would be difficult to interpret.  Thus, we compare lesbian household heads and lesbians 
who are not household heads to all partnered heterosexual women, the large majority of 
whom are secondary earners (and recall the entire sample is conditioned on full-time 
work).  Similarly, we compare gay male household heads and gay males who are not 
household heads to all partnered heterosexual men. 
                                                                                                                                          
following way: first, if one member of the partnership was a full-time worker and the other member was 
not a full-time worker, the full-time worker is coded as the household head.  Second, if both members of 
the household are full-time workers, we coded as household head the person in the couple who was older.  
Third, if both members of the couple were full-time workers and were the same age, we used the ‘first 
person listed in the record’ as the household head.  This approach returned 28.3% of partnered 
heterosexual women as ‘household heads’. 
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The results are presented in Table 2.6 and provide some notable support in favor 
of household specialization underlying the lesbian premium relative to heterosexual 
women in the sample of partnered individuals.17  To see this note that in column 2 of 
Table 2.6 we estimate that partnered lesbians who are household heads earn 
significantly more than similarly situated partnered heterosexual women by about 7 
percent.  Partnered lesbians who are not household heads do not earn significantly more 
than similarly situated partnered heterosexual women, though the point estimate also 
indicates a sizable premium.  Importantly, we cannot reject that the coefficients on 
‘lesbian, household head’ and ‘lesbian, not household head’ are equal.  This is consistent 
with the idea that lesbian households specialize less than heterosexual households.   
For gay men, we observe quite a different pattern than for lesbians.  Specifically, 
the results in column 1 of Table 2.6 indicate that the earnings penalty experienced by 
partnered gay men compared to partnered heterosexual men accrues exclusively to the 
person in the partnership who is not the household head.  Unlike the results for lesbians, 
we can reject equality of the coefficients between ‘gay, household head’ and ‘gay, not 
household head’.  This result provides support for the hypothesis that gay male 
households have significant levels of specialization.   Since specialization in 
heterosexual households is often ascribed in large part to child-raising responsibilities, 
this is a surprising result given the small percentage of gay male households with young 
children.	
17 The sample sizes in Table 2.6 are smaller than those for the earnings analyses presented in the main 
paper by approximately 10,000 observations (approximately 6,000 men and 4,000 women).  This is 
because there are many observations in the IHS where we observe earnings and work information for one 
member of the partnership but not the other member.  Since our household head definition requires us to 
observe this information for both members of the couple, we necessarily drop these observations. 
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Oaxaca Blinder decompositions 
Finally, we investigate Oaxaca Blinder decompositions following Arabsheibani 
et al. (2005).18  Table 2.7 reports the mean predictions by group differences for the 
baseline specification.  We estimate models separately by partnership status for 
comparisons of lesbian and gay men to their associated heterosexual counterparts, 
though for space considerations (and because partnership differences were not that 
important for the earlier results on the bisexual wage gap) we do not present results 
separately by partnership status for comparisons of bisexuals to heterosexuals.  The top 
row shows differences between partnered gay men and partnered heterosexual men, the 
second row shows differences between non-partnered gay men and non-partnered 
heterosexual men, the third row shows differences between bisexual men and 
heterosexual men, the fourth row shows differences between partnered lesbians and 
partnered heterosexual women, the fifth row shows differences between non-partnered 
lesbians and non-partnered heterosexual women, and the bottom row shows differences 
between bisexual women and heterosexual women.  Within each row we show the raw 
(unadjusted) wage gap between the two groups in column 1; the amount of the gap that 
can be accounted for by different endowments or characteristics in column 2; the 
amount of the gap that can be accounted for by different returns to characteristics or 
‘coefficients’ in column 3; and the interaction in column 4. 
For gay men compared to heterosexual men, recall that we did not find strong 
evidence of differences in average wages, with a limited negative effect comparing 
partnered men.  In any case, the estimates in the top two rows of Table 2.7 indicate that 
the majority of any wage difference between gay men and heterosexual men – both in 
                                                
18 We use the method described in Jann (2008). 
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comparisons of partnered people and non-partnered people – can be attributed to 
different endowments, not different returns.  Turning to comparisons between bisexual 
men and heterosexual men in the third row – where we found much larger earnings 
differences – the decomposition indicates that the vast majority of the earnings 
advantage experienced by heterosexual men can be attributed to their higher returns to 
characteristics, not their differential endowment of skills.19 
Turning to the comparison of partnered lesbians to partnered heterosexual 
women in the fourth row of Table 2.7, we find that the lesbian earnings advantage 
documented in the sample of partnered people is approximately equally attributable to 
different endowments and different returns.  The same is true but to a lesser extent for 
comparisons of non-partnered lesbians to non-partnered heterosexual women in the fifth 
row of Table 2.7 where we find a somewhat greater explanatory role for characteristics 
relative to returns.20  Both of these cases contrast to the decomposition results for 
partnered and non-partnered gay men compared to partnered and non-partnered 
heterosexual men where we found that the mean gap was attributable much more to 
differential endowments compared with very little role for differential returns to 
                                                
19 Note that the wage gap in column 1 reports the mean predictions by groups without covariates, and a 
negative sign indicates that the non-heterosexual group experiences a premium in the raw unadjusted 
means compared to the heterosexual group.  This is why there are negative signs on the wage gap in rows 
1 and 2: partnered and non-partnered gay men earn more than partnered and non-partnered heterosexual 
men, respectively.  Comparisons of their characteristics would predict that the partnered and non-
partnered gay men would earn even more than the partnered and non-partnered heterosexual men based 
solely on characteristics since, for example, the gay men have higher education levels than the 
heterosexual men.  This is why the coefficients on the characteristics in rows 1 and 2 are both even larger 
and negative than the raw wage gap.  For the bisexual men the raw wage gap in column 1 is positive, 
meaning that the bisexual men earn much less than the heterosexual men in unadjusted comparisons.	
20	 Again, note that for partnered and non-partnered lesbians compared to partnered and non-partnered 
heterosexual women, both raw wage gap estimates are negative, indicating that the lesbians earn more 
than the heterosexual women in unadjusted comparisons.  As with the gay men, the coefficient on the 
characteristics is negative, suggesting that the partnered and non-partnered lesbians would earn even more 
than the partnered and non-partnered heterosexual women based solely on characteristics since, for 
example, lesbians have higher education levels than heterosexual women. 
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endowments.  Finally, for the comparison of bisexual women and heterosexual women 
in the bottom row of Table 2.7, we find that all the earnings advantage for heterosexual 
women is due to differential returns to endowments as opposed to differential 
endowments, similar to the findings for bisexual men compared to heterosexual men in 
the third row. 
 
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion 
The main objective in this paper is to try to shed light on the somewhat contrasting 
results in the literature on sexual orientation and earnings for full population samples 
and those that only include partnered individuals.  The latter studies have had the 
advantage of being much larger samples drawn from census data and other sources.  But 
there has been a question as to how representative partnered individuals are over the 
whole lesbian and gay population.  We have used what is to our knowledge the first 
countrywide dataset with both partnership status and self-identified sexual orientation 
combined with high-quality data on labor market earnings. 
Over the population in full-time work (adopted as our main sample to be 
consistent with the bulk of the existing literature), we found a significant negative sexual 
orientation-based earnings coefficient for partnered gay men compared to partnered 
heterosexual men and a significant positive coefficient for partnered lesbians compared 
to partnered heterosexual women.  There is no significant effect for non-partnered gay 
men or lesbians compared to non-partnered heterosexual men and women.  The positive 
partnered lesbian effect is sufficiently strong that the lesbian coefficient on earnings 
remains significantly positive over the whole population sample.  This does not hold for 
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the negative earnings coefficient for gay men.  Our results therefore are consistent with 
the literature: using partnered sexual minorities tends to show stronger effects than for 
those studies using the whole population of partnered and non-partnered individuals. 
We have argued that these basic results are consistent with specialization.  
Traditional heterosexual partners typically involve gendered specialization, with the 
man more engaged in market activities than the woman, particularly given the higher 
prevalence of children among heterosexual couples.  Other things equal, the average 
partnered heterosexual man will be more focused upon market activities than the 
average gay man.  By the same argument, the average partnered lesbian will be more 
focused upon market activities than the average partnered heterosexual woman.  And 
these differences should not accrue to non-partnered individuals.  All of these 
specialization-based predictions hold in our data.  Our findings that the lesbian premium 
among partnered individuals accrues approximately equally to lesbians who are 
household heads and lesbians who are not household heads also supports the idea that 
there is less specialization in a lesbian household. 
An alternative hypothesis for why partnered lesbians may have an observed 
earnings premium not shared by non-partnered lesbians is that there is a high partnership 
selectivity effect.  Partnered individuals may be selected as the more productive 
individuals, and the unobserved heterogeneity that facilitates forming a partnership may 
also be useful in the workplace.  Moreover, this may vary by sexual orientation.  We see 
from the descriptive data in Table 2.1, however, that lesbians are just as likely to be in a 
partnership as are heterosexual women.  They are, however, more likely to be in full-
time work.  In this case, if the underlying selectivity effect is the same for both 
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heterosexual and lesbian women, then the lesbian earnings differential among partnered 
women in full-time work should be less than the associated differential among non-
partnered women in full-time work, since the average partnered lesbian in full-time 
work will have less favorable unobserved heterogeneity than the average partnered 
heterosexual woman.  Since this is contrary to what we find, this casts doubt on the 
selectivity explanation for the lesbian premium for partnered women.21 
While comparative specialization within the household is our preferred 
explanation for most of our results, there is some limited evidence for the presence of 
discrimination as an explanatory factor.  Our results show that it is older gay men and 
partnered gay men that earn less than comparable heterosexual men.  It is likely that the 
lack of a heterosexual marriage becomes more of a signal of sexual minority status as an 
individual gets older (Carpenter 2007, Frank 2007).22  Partnered gay men may also be 
more observable as being gay than non-partnered counterparts.  They may have photos 
of a same-sex partner or list their same-sex partner as a beneficiary, for example.  If 
there is discrimination against gay men, these more observable individuals may bear a 
greater penalty.  Further, the gay male penalty only occurs outside London, where there 
is likely to be a stronger taste for discrimination.  Finally, the bisexual male penalty only 
21 In results not reported but available upon request we also found very little evidence of positive selection 
into partnership on the basis of education for gay men and lesbians, in contrast to prior results for gay men 
and lesbians in the United States (Carpenter and Gates 2008). 
22 Notably, there are other non-discrimination based explanations for the gay male earnings penalty 
accruing to older men.  For example, there could be wealth effects for gay men associated with their much 
lower likelihood of raising children.  In results not reported but available upon request we found that the 
significantly lower likelihood of full-time employment experienced by gay men in Table 2.2 is driven 
primarily by significantly lower full-time employment rates of older (i.e., 45-64 years old) gay men 
compared to similarly situated older heterosexual men.  In contrast, employment rates for 25-44 year old 
gay men were not significantly different to those for similar heterosexual men.  That the employment gap 
for gay men only is observed for the older sample suggests that wealth effects on earnings may be 
important even in the absence of any labor market discrimination. 
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occurs in the private sector and not the public sector where there are greater protections 
against discrimination.23 
However, there is also evidence against the discrimination hypothesis in both the 
male and female comparisons.  Among the full sample of partnered and non-partnered 
men, the presence of a large bisexual male penalty coupled with the absence of a gay 
male penalty is difficult to square with simple theories of taste-based discrimination.  
Similarly, among the full sample of women we observed that lesbians earn more than 
heterosexual women and that the premium occurs in samples of lower educated women 
and women outside of London – both places where we would normally expect greater 
discrimination if it existed.  Also, the premium occurs among partnered and not non-
partnered lesbians, and the same argument as with gay men suggests that these 
individuals will be more observable and therefore more subject to any discrimination. 
Taken together, then, our unique samples of partnered and non-partnered sexual 
minorities and high quality data on earnings provide novel evidence supporting a role 
for specialization in explaining sexual orientation-based differences in labor market 
earnings, with less evidence for selectivity and at best limited and mixed support for 
discrimination.  As more large-scale social science datasets add individual level 
information on sexual orientation, future work in other countries and contexts can 
continue to inform our understanding of how a minority sexual orientation shapes 
economic outcomes. 
23 We also note that for both bisexual men and bisexual women, Table 2.7 indicated that the raw earnings 
penalty arises due to lower returns to bisexual individuals’ characteristics rather than lower endowments 
for bisexual individuals.  This pattern is quite consistent with discrimination against bisexual individuals, 
and indeed it is possible that there are different levels and patterns of discrimination against bisexual 
individuals compared to gay men and lesbians. 
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Table 2.1 
Descriptive Characteristics – Demographics (among those with earnings information) 
2012-2014 UK Integrated Household Surveys 
Variables Heterosexual men Bisexual men Gay men 
Heterosexual 
women Bisexual women Lesbians 
Age 44.91 (10.63) 43.63 (11.30) 41.95 (9.80) 44.23 (10.26) 41.45 (10.18) 40.78 (9.36) 
Highest education level: 
University degree 0.308 (0.462) 0.409 (0.493) A   0.470 (0.499) A 0.307 (0.461) 0.427 (0.495) B 0.440 (0.497) B 
Some higher education 0.118 (0.322) 0.119 (0.325) 0.121 (0.327) 0.131 (0.337) 0.103 (0.304) 0.139 (0.347) 
A (‘advanced’) level  0.255 (0.436)   0.165 (0.372) A   0.202 (0.401) A 0.194 (0.395) 0.166 (0.372) 0.179 (0.383) 
O (‘ordinary’) level 0.210 (0.407) 0.165 (0.372)   0.158 (0.365) A 0.278 (0.448) 0.252 (0.435) 0.194 (0.396) B 
White 0.905 (0.293)   0.795 (0.405) A 0.952 (0.215) A 0.928 (0.258) 0.911 (0.284)  0.963 (0.189) B 
Partnered 0.737 (0.440)   0.517 (0.501) A 0.497 (0.500) A 0.665 (0.472) 0.734 (0.442) B 0.690 (0.463) 
Any Child <16 0.278 (0.448)   0.182 (0.387) A 0.012 (0.110) A 0.340 (0.474) 0.305 (0.461) 0.129 (0.335) B 
England 0.744 (0.436) 0.744 (0.437) 0.829 (0.377) A 0.730 (0.444) 0.800 (0.401) B 0.789 (0.408) B 
London 0.087 (0.282)   0.210 (0.409) A 0.226 (0.419) A 0.079 (0.270) 0.163 (0.370) B 0.113 (0.317) B 
N. Ireland & Wales & Scotland 0.256 (0.436) 0.256 (0.437) 0.171 (0.377) A 0.270 (0.444) 0.200 (0.401) B 0.211 (0.408) B 
Avg. Weekly Earnings 639.00 (515.30) 527.5 (316.30)A 677.10 (814.70) A 396.00 (411.80) 409.30 (278.40) 515.20 (310.10) B 
Full-time worker 0.917 (0.275) 0.903 (0.296) 0.903 (0.296) 0.564 (0.496) 0.615 (0.487) B 0.807 (0.395) B 
Sample Size 73318 176 1220 94810 429 839 
Weighted means (standard deviations). Not reported (but included in the models) there are 7,020 men and 7,469 women who, when asked about sexual 
orientation, responded ‘other’, ‘don’t know’ or who refused a response. A The superscript letter A means statistically significant difference (P < 0.05) between the 
groups of gay men and bisexual men in contrast to the heterosexual men. B The superscript letter B means statistically significant difference (P < 0.05) between 
the groups of lesbians and bisexual women in contrast to the heterosexual women.  
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Table 2.2 
Sexual Orientation and Full-time Employment 
UK IHS 2012-2014, Adults age 25+ 
Males Females 
Controls for è 
(1) 
Sexual orientation + year 
dummies 
(2) 
+ demographic characteristics 
(age, race, education, any 
kids, residence) + year 
dummies 
(3) 
Sexual orientation + year 
dummies 
(4) 
+ demographic characteristics 
(age, race, education, any 
kids, residence) + year 
dummies 
Full sample 
Gay/Lesbian 0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.045*** 
(0.012) 
0.230*** 
(0.017) 
0.082*** 
(0.017) 
Bisexual -0.107*** 
(0.034) 
-0.119*** 
(0.032) 
-0.022 
(0.021) 
-0.054*** 
(0.020) 
R-squared 0.001 0.164 0.003 0.161 
N 121206 121206 175285 175285 
Non-partnered 
Gay/Lesbian 0.092*** 
(0.019) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
0.099*** 
(0.032) 
-0.052* 
(0.031) 
Bisexual -0.069 
(0.046) 
-0.117*** 
(0.043) 
-0.056 
(0.039) 
-0.146*** 
(0.035) 
R-squared 0.003 0.171 0.002 0.202 
N 39508 39508 62650 62650 
Partnered 
Gay/Lesbian 0.025 
(0.018) 
-0.061***
(0.016) 
0.300*** 
(0.020) 
0.154*** 
(0.019) 
Bisexual -0.029 
(0.047) 
-0.029 
(0.047) 
-0.004 
(0.025) 
-0.014 
(0.023) 
R-squared 0.001 0.178 0.004 0.149 
N 81698 81698 112635 112635 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Specific controls in columns 2 and 4 include: a dummy variable for being interviewed 
face-to-face; age and its square; dummy variables for degree levels, higher education (HE qualification below degree level), A-levels, O-levels; race/ethnicity 
dummies (white, black, Asian, mixed race, other race); location dummies (London, England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland); the presence of children (any child 
<5 & any child ≥5) in the household; and year dummies. Columns 2 and 4 in the top panel also include a control for being in any kind of partnership. 
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Table 2.3 
Sexual Orientation and Log Earnings, Full-time workers 
UK IHS 2012-2014, Adults age 25+ 
Males Females 
Controls for è 
(1) 
Sexual orientation + year 
dummies 
(2) 
+ demographic characteristics 
(age, race, education, any 
kids, residence) + year 
dummies 
(3) 
Sexual orientation + year 
dummies 
(4) 
+ demographic characteristics 
(age, race, education, any 
kids, residence) + year 
dummies 
All 
Gay/Lesbian 0.061*** 
(0.021) 
-0.027 
(0.019) 
0.124*** 
(0.024) 
0.054*** 
(0.021) 
Bisexual -0.134** 
(0.053) 
-0.149*** 
(0.044) 
0.004 
(0.035) 
-0.036 
(0.032) 
R-squared 0.001 0.198 0.001 0.231 
N 75017 75017 59221 59221 
Non-partnered 
Gay/Lesbian 0.126*** 
(0.027) 
-0.006 
(0.025) 
0.115** 
(0.047) 
0.029 
(0.037) 
Bisexual -0.038 
(0.082) 
-0.110 
(0.068) 
0.013 
(0.053) 
-0.097* 
(0.050) 
R-squared 0.007 0.189 0.003 0.247 
N 19905 19905 22385 22385 
Partnered 
Gay/Lesbian 0.062* 
(0.032) 
-0.050* 
(0.028) 
0.124*** 
(0.028) 
0.067*** 
(0.025) 
Bisexual -0.164** 
(0.066) 
-0.189*** 
 (0.057) 
-0.002 
(0.044) 
-0.009 
 (0.040) 
R-squared 0.001 0.191 0.002 0.224 
N 55112 55112 36836 36836 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Specific controls in columns 2 and 4 include: a dummy variable for being interviewed 
face-to-face; age and its square; dummy variables for degree levels, higher education (HE qualification below degree level), A-levels, O-levels; race/ethnicity 
dummies (white, black, Asian, mixed race, other race); location dummies (London, England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland); the presence of children (any child 
<5 & any child ≥5) in the household; and year dummies. Columns 2 and 4 in the top panel also include a control for being in any kind of partnership. 
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Table 2.4a 
Sexual Orientation and Log Earnings, various subsamples, males 
Specification is Table 2.3, Column 2 
UK IHS 2012-2014, Adults age 25+ 
(1) 
Baseline: full-time 
workers (Table 2.3, 
Column 2) 
(2) 
All workers 
(3) 
London residents, 
full-time workers 
(4) 
Non-London 
residents, full-time 
workers 
(5) 
Private sector full-
time workers 
(6) 
Public sector full-
time workers 
All males 
Gay -0.027 
(0.019) 
-0.041** 
(0.021) 
0.051 
(0.039) 
-0.070*** 
(0.020) 
-0.022 
(0.024) 
-0.030 
(0.027) 
Bisexual -0.149*** 
(0.044) 
-0.185*** 
(0.062) 
-0.190** 
(0.076) 
-0.126*** 
(0.054) 
-0.174*** 
(0.051) 
-0.017 
(0.079) 
R-squared 0.198 0.182 0.179 0.191 0.199 0.199 
N 75017 81734 6793 68224 58539 16459 
Non-partnered 
males 
Gay -0.006 
(0.025) 
-0.035 
(0.028) 
0.057 
(0.050) 
-0.041 
(0.027) 
0.011 
(0.030) 
-0.026 
(0.041) 
Bisexual -0.110 
(0.068) 
-0.134 
(0.084) 
-0.166 
(0.130) 
-0.095 
(0.080) 
-0.122* 
(0.074) 
-0.029 
(0.112) 
R-squared 0.189 0.175 0.169 0.176 0.188 0.198 
N 19905 21910 2237 17668 15804 4089 
Partnered males 
Gay -0.050* 
(0.028) 
-0.049 
(0.031) 
0.049 
(0.062) 
-0.094*** 
(0.029) 
-0.059 
(0.037) 
-0.013 
(0.036) 
Bisexual -0.189*** 
 (0.057) 
-0.242*** 
(0.091) 
-0.220** 
(0.100) 
-0.168** 
(0.072) 
-0.235*** 
(0.068) 
-0.023 
(0.100) 
R-squared 0.191 0.174 0.187 0.183 0.193 0.194 
N 55112 59824 4556 50556 42735 12370 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 2.3.  Models in the top panel also 
include a control for being in any kind of partnership. 
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Table 2.4b 
Sexual Orientation and Log Earnings, various subsamples, females 
Specification is Table 2.3, Column 4 
UK IHS 2012-2014, Adults age 25+ 
(1) 
Baseline: full-time 
workers (Table 
2.3, Column 4) 
(2) 
All workers 
(3) 
London residents, 
full-time workers 
(4) 
Non-London 
residents, full-time 
workers 
(5) 
Private sector full-
time workers 
(6) 
Public sector full-
time workers 
All females 
Lesbian 0.054*** 
(0.021) 
0.135*** 
(0.028) 
0.014 
(0.071) 
0.063*** 
(0.020) 
0.044 
(0.028) 
0.067** 
(0.030) 
Bisexual -0.036 
(0.032) 
-0.062 
(0.039) 
-0.059 
(0.064) 
-0.030 
(0.037) 
-0.048 
(0.044) 
-0.020 
(0.041) 
R-squared 0.231 0.224 0.180 0.219 0.211 0.243 
N 59221 103547 5753 53468 33695 25521 
Non-partnered females 
Lesbian 0.029 
(0.037) 
-0.014 
(0.064) 
-0.000 
(0.092) 
0.036 
(0.040) 
0.008 
(0.051) 
0.063 
(0.055) 
Bisexual -0.097* 
(0.050) 
0.146** 
(0.060) 
-0.119 
(0.132) 
-0.094* 
(0.054) 
-0.087 
(0.059) 
-0.120 
(0.084) 
R-squared 0.247 0.279 0.185 0.233 0.221 0.273 
N 22385 34792 2749 19636 13259 9122 
Partnered females 
Lesbian 0.067*** 
(0.025) 
0.199*** 
(0.029) 
0.036 
(0.098) 
0.075*** 
(0.024) 
0.064* 
(0.034) 
0.072** 
(0.036) 
Bisexual -0.009 
 (0.040) 
-0.040 
(0.049) 
-0.029 
(0.073) 
-0.003 
(0.048) 
-0.027 
(0.060) 
0.011 
(0.045) 
R-squared 0.224 0.203 0.190 0.212 0.208 0.230 
N 36836 68755 3004 33832 20436 16399 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 2.3.  Models in the top panel also 
include a control for being in any kind of partnership. 
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Table 2.5a 
Sexual Orientation and Log Earnings, by demographics, males 
Specification is Table 2.3, Column 2 
UK IHS 2012-2014, Adults age 25+ 
(1) 
Baseline: full-time 
workers (Table 2.3, 
Column 2) 
(2) 
25-45 year olds, full-
time workers 
(3) 
46-65 year olds, full-
time workers 
(4) 
Education greater than 
A-levels, full-time 
workers 
(5) 
Education A-levels or 
less, full-time workers 
All males 
Gay -0.027 
(0.019) 
0.001 
(0.023) 
-0.092*** 
(0.032) 
-0.029 
(0.024) 
-0.021 
(0.029) 
Bisexual -0.149*** 
(0.044) 
-0.161*** 
(0.055) 
-0.124* 
(0.070) 
-0.195*** 
(0.057) 
-0.138* 
(0.074) 
R-squared 0.198 0.214 0.177 0.111 0.087 
N 75017 39069 35948 32640 38656 
Non-partnered males 
Gay -0.006 
(0.025) 
0.007 
(0.031) 
-0.041 
(0.039) 
-0.023 
(0.033) 
0.039 
(0.036) 
Bisexual -0.110 
(0.068) 
-0.094 
(0.089) 
-0.114 
(0.088) 
-0.159* 
(0.089) 
-0.126 
(0.115) 
R-squared 0.189 0.206 0.173 0.108 0.073 
N 19905 10814 9091 8219 10457 
Partnered males 
Gay -0.050* 
(0.028) 
-0.011 
(0.033) 
-0.134*** 
(0.050) 
-0.035 
(0.036) 
-0.084* 
(0.047) 
Bisexual -0.189*** 
 (0.057) 
-0.221*** 
(0.066) 
-0.121 
(0.105) 
-0.227*** 
(0.075) 
-0.159* 
(0.093) 
R-squared 0.191 0.210 0.167 0.101 0.080 
N 55112 28255 26857 24421 28199 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 2.3.  Models in the top panel also 
include a control for being in any kind of partnership. 
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Table 2.5b 
Sexual Orientation and Log Earnings, by demographics, females 
Specification is Table 2.3, Column 4 
UK IHS 2012-2014, Adults age 25+ 
(1) 
Baseline: full-time 
workers (Table 2.3, 
Column 4) 
(2) 
25-45 year olds, full-
time workers 
(3) 
46-65 year olds, full-
time workers 
(4) 
Education greater than 
A-levels, full-time 
workers 
(5) 
Education A-levels or 
less, full-time workers 
All females 
Lesbian 0.054*** 
(0.021) 
0.030 
(0.022) 
0.079* 
(0.048) 
0.028 
(0.026) 
0.100*** 
(0.034) 
Bisexual -0.036 
(0.032) 
-0.030 
(0.036) 
-0.045 
(0.065) 
-0.075** 
(0.037) 
0.004 
(0.058) 
R-squared 0.231 0.227 0.250 0.125 0.046 
N 59221 31775 27446 29779 27158 
Non-partnered 
females 
Lesbian 0.029 
(0.037) 
-0.024 
(0.045) 
0.136** 
(0.066) 
0.016 
(0.050) 
0.062 
(0.053) 
Bisexual -0.097* 
(0.050) 
-0.073 
(0.050) 
-0.142 
(0.128) 
-0.155** 
(0.066) 
0.049 
(0.062) 
R-squared 0.247 0.249 0.260 0.131 0.073 
N 22385 11160 11225 10663 10642 
Partnered females 
Lesbian 0.067*** 
(0.025) 
0.057** 
(0.025) 
0.056 
(0.062) 
0.037 
(0.031) 
0.119*** 
(0.044) 
Bisexual -0.009 
 (0.040) 
-0.013 
(0.048) 
0.000 
(0.073) 
-0.027 
(0.042) 
-0.004 
(0.072) 
R-squared 0.224 0.217 0.248 0.125 0.035 
N 36836 20615 16221 19116 16516 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 2.3.  Models in the top panel also 
include a control for being in any kind of partnership.  
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Table 2.6 
Sexual Orientation and Log Earnings, by Household Head Status for Sexual Minorities 
Sample is partnered full-time workers 
Specification is Table 2.3, Columns 2 and 4 
UK IHS 2012-2014, Adults age 25+ 
(1) 
Men 
(2) 
Women 
Gay/Lesbian & Household Head 0.002 
(0.034) 
0.071** 
(0.031) 
Gay/Lesbian & Not Household Head -0.141*** 
(0.045) 
0.057 
(0.039) 
R-squared 0.187 0.225 
N 48688 32862 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Controls include: a dummy variable for being interviewed face-to-face; age and its 
square; dummy variables for degree levels, higher education (HE qualification below degree level), A-levels, O-levels; race/ethnicity dummies (white, black, 
Asian, mixed race, other race); location dummies (London, England, Scotland, and Northern Ireland); the presence of children (any child <5 & any child ≥5) in 
the household; and year dummies. 
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Table 2.7 
Oaxaca Decompositions 
Baseline Specification, with Demographic Controls 
UK IHS 2012-2014, Adults age 25+ 
(1) 
Wage Gap 
(2) 
Characteristics 
(3) 
Coefficients 
(4) 
Interaction 
Partnered gay men vs. partnered heterosexual men 
 
-0.124 
(0.061) 
-0.254 
(0.104) 
0.010 
(0.053) 
0.120 
(0.100) 
Non-partnered gay men vs. non- partnered heterosexual men 
-0.064 
(0.045) 
-0.125 
(0.034) 
0.038 
(0.040) 
0.023 
(0.028) 
Bisexual men vs. heterosexual men 
 0.181 
(0.089) 
0.048 
(0.083) 
0.232 
(0.078) 
-0.099 
(0.071) 
Partnered lesbians vs. partnered heterosexual women 
 -0.128 
(0.044) 
-0.057 
(0.050) 
-0.048 
(0.039) 
-0.023 
(0.046) 
Non-partnered lesbians vs. non-partnered heterosexual women 
 -0.085 
(0.081) 
-0.091 
(0.074) 
-0.043 
(0.061) 
0.049 
(0.053) 
Bisexual women vs. heterosexual women 
0.052 
(0.057) 
-0.006 
(0.045) 
0.081 
(0.046) 
-0.023 
(0.031) 
Notes: For details on control variables, see notes to Table 2.3. 
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Chapter 3 
The Effects of Unemployment on Fertility: 
Evidence from England 
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3.1 Introduction 
This paper examines how local unemployment affects household fertility outcomes. 
The standard economic models of fertility imply that unemployment has a potential 
offsetting impact on fertility, as it leads to a substantial fall in income. Assuming that 
children are a normal good, an increase in unemployment will have a negative impact 
on the demand for children in the current period, holding other factors constant. In 
societies with traditional gender roles, the income effect can be expected to be the 
main effect of male unemployment. Conversely, among females, unemployment 
decreases the opportunity cost of childrearing and may potentially increase birth rates. 
The final outcome will depend on individuals’ expectations of the duration of 
joblessness and human capital depreciation as well as the strength of the net income 
effect. 
There is a growing body of literature that investigates the impact of 
unemployment on household fertility decisions. However, the findings from the 
existing literature are mixed and occasionally contradictory.1 In response, the current 
paper seeks to clarify the causal impact of unemployment on fertility and to 
demonstrate how previous mixed results may be due to differences in behavior among 
demographic subgroups. Ultimately, it concentrates on three key research questions: 
1. Is the overall effect of unemployment on current fertility positive or negative?
2. Is the impact different for male and female unemployment and across different
age groups?2
3. Are there further demographic characteristics that shape the fertility response
to unemployment?3
The current paper builds on the recent contribution by Schaller (2015) who,
1 See Sobotka, Vegard, and Philipov (2011) for a review of the earlier literature. 
2 16–24 male, 25–34 male, 35–44 male, 16–24 female, 25–34 female, 35–44 female. 
3 Educational attainment, country of birth and marital status. 
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using US data, explicitly considers the role of gender-specific labor market conditions 
on fertility. It consequently reexamines the relationship between unemployment and 
fertility using English data with a particular focus on demographic subgroups. The 
main analysis starts with an estimation of a fixed effects model where current fertility 
by county and year is related to lagged unemployment while controlling for 
demographic characteristics and house prices. This is followed by a breakdown of the 
overall relationship by gender-specific unemployment and by age group. In order to 
address the potential endogeneity issue, an instrumental variables (IV) strategy is 
implemented based on the approach of Bartik (1991), in which labor demand shocks 
are used as an identifying source of variation. Although aggregate local 
unemployment leads to an increase in fertility, the analysis reveals important 
difference across demographic subgroups.4 In particular, both the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and IV estimations show that for the prime-aged cohort (25–34), male 
unemployment is negatively associated with the fertility, whereas female 
unemployment has a positive effect on birth rates. The results tend in a similar 
direction among the younger age group of 16–24, where male unemployment appears 
to have a negative impact on the current period fertility, while female unemployment 
has the opposite effect. These main findings are in line with the theoretical prediction 
outlined above. In addition, particular demographic factors differentially shape the 
fertility response across age groups. Specifically, education, country of birth and 
partnership status mediate the relationship between prime-aged individuals’ labor 
market conditions and fertility more than that between youth labor market conditions 
and fertility. 
4 The countercyclical fertility behavior supports the predictions of Butz and Ward’s (1979) model. They 
argue that as female employment rate increases in a country, negative labor demand shocks significantly 
reduce the cost of childbearing and women take advantage of this “joblessness” term. 
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The present paper thus sheds light on the mixed results in the existing 
literature, particularly showing how the relationship between unemployment and 
fertility varies across demographic subgroups. First and foremost, there are strong 
reasons to expect that the relationship between unemployment and fertility may vary 
across age groups. Second, in order to disentangle the effect of gender-specific 
unemployment, it is important to control for both male and female unemployment 
simultaneously. Finally, the current paper also contributes to the existing literature by 
tackling the issue of endogeneity using a Bartik-style IV approach. 
The paper proceeds with an initial section introducing the conceptual 
framework and related literature. Section 3.3 subsequently focuses on data and 
methodology while Section 3.4 presents the results, and Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Conceptual Framework and Related Literature 
In recent years, there have been a number of contributions exploring the cyclical nature 
of fertility. These studies show that the fall in fertility rates coincides with higher 
levels of female unemployment (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000; Esping-Andersen 2009; 
Engelhardt and Prskawetz 2004). The standard theoretical framework typically put 
forward builds on the work of Becker (1960) and depicts couples as utility-maximizing 
agents deciding on the number of children and on child-related expenditures. In this 
respect, two main approaches introduced children as a normal good into economic 
models of fertility. The quality and quantity approach (Becker 1960; Becker and Lewis 
1973; Willis 1973) implies that an increase in income may have depressing effects on 
fertility. It relies on the fact that income elasticity for the number of children is 
substantially less than that for quality of children.5 The timing of the fertility approach 
5 Becker (1960) altered his model and added a “quality” variable in order to explain the observed inverse 
The Effects of Unemployment on Fertility: Evidence from England 
	 55 
(Mincer 1963; Becker 1960) attributes the low opportunity cost of childrearing during 
recessions, which could imply a positive relationship between unemployment and 
fertility. Where “traditional” gender roles exist, the main effect of male unemployment 
can be expected to be the income effect. Conversely, female unemployment can be 
expected to have both a negative income effect and a potentially positive opportunity 
cost effect. In other words, an increase in male unemployment may lead to a fall in 
fertility.6 While a rise in female unemployment may also cause a decline in fertility, it 
nevertheless has a potential substitution effect that goes in the direction of increasing 
births as opportunity cost becomes lower.7 
In terms of the female income effect on fertility, previous studies appear to 
show that women choose to have fewer children as a result of an increase in the 
economic costs of childrearing (Easterlin 1973; Mincer 1963). This may occur 
because the “female time intensity” of children is still a key component in the price of 
fertility, and because the costs of having children for their careers and lifecycle income 
are substantial. In fact, it has been shown that the unemployment duration of a woman 
in the labor force is affected by her previous work experience and her lifetime 
allocation of time, which in turn is intimately related to her fertility decisions (Mincer 
1963). An additional determinant affecting ideal timing of fertility is human capital 
depreciation. It may be argued that most women’s human capital investment in 
schooling is completed before childrearing starts, and thus the cost of childrearing may 
also be related to women’s educational attainment and to their employment 
                                                
relationship between income and fertility. However, Jones, Schoonbroodt, and Tertilt (2008) show that 
without assuming a high elasticity of substitution between children and consumption, the quality–
quantity approach does not sufficiently explain an inverse income–fertility relationship. 
6 Kravdal (2002) takes the discussion further and suggests that unemployed men are less attractive as a 
potential husband for the family formation, which may also reduce the possibility of fertility. 
7 Some papers in the literature focus on how fertility rates are affected by an exogenous change in 
household income. For example, Lindo (2010) shows that birth rates are negatively affected by lower 
household income due to job loss. Black et al. (2013) show that the 1970s coal boom in West Virginia 
caused an unexpected increase in income, which also led to an increase in fertility. 
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possibilities.8 
Schaller (2015) provides a recent examination of this issue and investigates the 
differential impacts of male and female unemployment on fertility. Her results show 
that although birth rates follow a pro-cyclical pattern at the aggregate level in the 
United States, improvements in male labor market conditions are associated with 
increases in fertility, whereas improvements in female labor market conditions have 
the opposite effect. She also performs a particular examination of the demographic 
subgroups. Based on her analysis, the negative effect of unemployment becomes more 
pronounced for older people. Furthermore, single women and lower educated groups 
are highly impacted by the business cycles. The present paper shares with Schaller 
(2015) the emphasis on gender specific unemployment and demographic subgroup 
differences as a key determinant of the fertility outcome. An important difference is 
this paper additionally investigates how further demographic characteristics affect the 
unemployment–fertility relationship within age groups with different demographic 
characteristics, whereas Schaller (2015) does not make this distinction. Another 
contribution of my analysis comes from the fact that I can take house price changes 
into account. Recent evidence suggests that short-term increases in local house prices 
affect the fertility of home-owners positively but that of non-home-owners negatively 
in the United States (Dettling and Kearney 2014). Moreover, special attention should 
be devoted to England, because it exhibits different labor market properties from those 
of the United States, namely a considerable increase in female labor force participation 
(LFP) and a more rapid closing of the gender wage gap.9 
8 Heckman and Walker (1990) estimated semi-parametric reduced-form neoclassical models of life 
cycle fertility in Sweden and showed that rising female wages delay times to all conceptions and reduce 
total conceptions. Happel, Hill, and Low (1984) also argued that human capital accumulation is an 
important determinant of fertility timing. 
9 In England, the difference between the participation rate of men and women has shrunk remarkably 
from 14.5 percentage points in 1994 to 8.6 percentage points in the final quarter of 2011. Polachek and 
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The results in the literature so far are mixed and difficult to reconcile. Karaman 
Örsal, Dilan and Goldstein (2010) show a negative effect of both male and female 
unemployment on current fertility rates in 1976–2008 across 22 OECD (Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries. A number of recent papers 
report findings that countries with higher female unemployment have lower number 
of births since the early 1990s (Adsera 2005; Ahn and Mira 2002; Brewster and 
Rindfuss 2000). In contrast, Ozcan, Mayer, and Luedicke (2010) show that the male 
unemployment delays the first birth, but female unemployment does not affect fertility 
in West Germany. Overall, these studies thus highlight the need for further systematic 
examination of the unemployment and fertility phenomenon. 
3.3. Data and Methodology 
The principal empirical methodology of this paper involves relating county-level 
fertility rates to lagged county-level unemployment rates and to control for time-
varying county-level demographic characteristics. The following section briefly 
explains the main data sources and how the relevant variables are constructed. 
3.3.1 Data 
The fertility data used in this analysis come from the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS). It compiles counts of live births and stillbirths by age of mother and area of 
usual residence in England, years 1995–2011. Age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) are 
constructed by dividing the number of births by the relevant female population using 
mid-year population estimates that are based on the censuses, in which female ages 
range between 16 and 44.10 ASFRs provide an appropriate measure of varying fertility 
Xiang (2014) show that the gender wage gap is declining relatively more quickly in England – along 
with Canada and Korea – than in other countries. 
10 Age-gender cohorts are as follows: 16–24 male, 16–24 female, 25–34 male, 25–34 female, 35– 44 
male, 35–44 female. 
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rates since they are unaffected by changes in population age distribution and are well 
suited for comparing fertility rates across age groups. In this analysis, ASFRs are 
based on age intervals of 16–24, 25–34 and 35–44.11 As the best available measure of 
the labor market conditions prevailing at the time of the conception, births in calendar 
year, t, are matched with 1 year lagged, t – 1, data of Labor Force Survey (LFS) in the 
corresponding county.12 
Access to the confidential LFS was vital to conduct this study, as it was used 
to construct county–year–age group-specific unemployment rates and county– year–
age group-specific demographic characteristics. The sample is restricted in the age 
band 16–44 in order to study females who are of childbearing ages.13 Table 3.1 
presents the descriptive statistics for demographic characteristics and unemployment 
rates from the LFS, birth statistics from the ONS and house prices from the 
Department for Communities and Local Government.14 
11 The ONS’s age grouping is utilized in this analysis. 
12 Both Birth Statistics and LFS data are available in a finer geography; however, due to small cell size 
in some areas, it was preferred to aggregate up to the ceremonial county level. There are 49 ceremonial 
counties in England. After the exclusion of the City of London and Rutland the remaining ceremonial 
counties are as follows: Bedfordshire, Berkshire, Bristol, Buckinghamshire including Milton Keynes, 
Cambridgeshire including Peter-borough, Cheshire consisting of Cheshire East, Cheshire West and 
Chester, Halton and Warrington, Cornwall including Isles of Scilly, Cumbria, Derbyshire including 
Derby, Devon including Plymouth and Torbay, Dorset including Bournemouth and Poole, County 
Durham including Darlington, Hartlepool and Stockton-on-Tees north of the River Tees, East Riding 
of Yorkshire, including Kingston-upon- Hull, East Sussex including Brighton and Hove, Essex 
including Southend-on-Sea and Thurrock, Gloucestershire including South Gloucestershire, Inner and 
Outer London, Greater Manchester, Hampshire including Portsmouth and Southampton, Herefordshire, 
Hertfordshire, Isle of Wight, Kent including Medway, Lancashire including Blackburn with Darwen 
and Blackpool, Leicestershire including Leicester, Lincolnshire including North Lincolnshire and 
North East Lincolnshire, Merseyside, Norfolk, North Yorkshire including Middlesbrough, Redcar and 
Cleveland, York and Stockton-on-Tees south of the River Tees, Northamptonshire, Northumberland, 
Nottinghamshire including Nottingham, Oxfordshire, Shropshire including Telford and Wrekin, 
Somerset including Bath and North East Somerset and North Somerset, South Yorkshire, Staffordshire 
including Stoke-on-Trent, Suffolk, Surrey, Tyne and Wear, Warwickshire, West Midlands, West 
Sussex, West Yorkshire, Wiltshire including Swindon, Worcestershire. 
13 Over the sample period, the median age difference between husband and wife was 2.1 years. 
Furthermore, only 6.4% of men and 3.4% of women who married since 1995 were more 10 years older 
than their spouse. 
14 All unemployment rates are based on the ILO definition (those who are out of work in the reference 
week, want a job, have actively sought work in the last 4 weeks and are available to start work within 
the next 2 weeks). 
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Figure 3.1 illustrates fertility and unemployment patterns among counties. 
Northumberland, Cheshire and Dorset have the lowest average fertility rates in 
England and the South East region along with the Greater London experience the 
highest fertility. Merseyside, Tyne and Wear and West Midlands are the areas with 
the highest unemployment rate over the sample period. 
Figure 3. 2 shows trends in birth rates and unemployment rates by age groups 
at the national level.15 Birth rates follow a decreasing trend for age group 1 after 
reaching a peak of 53.2 births per 1,000 women in 1995. With regard to the 25–34 
band, birth rates rebounded after 2000 and reached its highest point of 112.2 in 2009. 
The oldest age group, 35–44, has experienced a tremendous rise in fertility rate, a 
steady increase from 21.3 to 35. Turning to the national time series data for 
unemployment rates, they notably differ in levels across age groups but follow a 
similar trend. The total unemployment rate reached its lowest point between 2002 and 
2005, and gradually increased afterwards. Overall, substantial variation across 
counties in Figure 3.1 and considerable shift in birth trends across age groups in Figure 
3.2 strongly suggest the inclusion of county-specific and age group-specific linear 
time trends. Additionally, from looking at the figure, birth rates appear to follow a 
countercyclical pattern over the analyzed time interval. 
In all, a balanced panel is constructed for the 1994–2010 period, with 47 
counties and three age groups. The final version of the dataset contains information 
on ASFRs, age- and gender-specific unemployment rates, educational attainment, 
marital status, ethnicity and country of birth. 
15 Trends in age-gender-specific unemployment rates do not distinctly differ from that of their age group 
counterparts. 
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3.3.2 Methodology 
In order to obtain baseline estimates of the relationship between unemployment and 
fertility, the following fixed effect specification is employed: 
ln(Ygct ) = βUgc(t−1) + ψXgc(t−1) + αc + θg + γt + ωc T + δg T + εgct 
The level of analysis is a county-year-age group cell. Ygct  is the birth rate in 
county c, age group g, in year t and Ugc(t−1) is the lagged unemployment rate.16 The 
county fixed effects, αc, and age group fixed effects, θg, are included to control for 
differences in birth rates across counties and age groups owing to time invariant 
unobservable factors. The year fixed effects, γt, account for movements in fertility 
rates over time that are shared by all counties. The county-specific linear time trends, 
ωc T, and age group-specific linear time trends, δg T, control for unobserved 
variables correlated with birth rates that change linearly over time within counties and 
age groups.17 Xgc(t−1) indicates lagged time-varying county-level demographic 
controls (country of birth, ethnicity, educational attainment and marital status) and 
house prices that account for changes in population composition and changes in the 
real estate market. The regressions are simultaneously carried out for both male and 
female unemployment in own age group.18 All regressions are weighted by the 
relevant population of women in each cell. 
This study uses the identification assumption that local unemployment rates 
are conditionally exogenous to household fertility outcomes. However, there are 
16 To be precise; t-1 refers to the year of conception. 
17 The inclusion of county-specific quadratic time trends was proved to be unimportant. 
18 The analysis for the age-gender-specific unemployment was performed with a similar specification
in which both lagged male -MaleUnempgc(t−1) – and female -FemaleUnempgc(t−1) – unemployment 
rates are included in the same regression. 
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certain concerns associated with the use of unemployment rates as exogenous 
regressors. One of these is that local unemployment rates might be correlated with 
changes in other unobserved variables that may affect the fertility decision of 
individuals. Second, there may be a positive correlation between fertility and local 
labor supply. If birth rates increase due to the changes in local labor supply, then the 
unemployment measure may be picking up this relationship rather than the effect of 
local labor market demand. Lastly, the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
definition of unemployment may not be able to capture the full extent of the local labor 
market conditions, causing a measurement error. The estimation strategy to deal with 
these problems is to specify a variable that can account for demand-induced variation 
in unemployment, and can thus be used to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of 
unemployment on fertility. To this end, the IV approach was adopted to explore the 
robustness of the OLS results. The predicted unemployment rates were built based on 
the work of Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz (1992), Schaller (2015) and Anderberg 
et al. (2015) for the UK case, where the initial industry composition of employment is 
interacted with the corresponding national industry-specific trends in unemployment. 
In particular, the local industry composition by gender and age group at baseline, 
defined as the calendar year 1993, is combined with industry-specific unemployment 
rates by gender, age group and time at the national level over the sample period.19 For 
each county, age group, gender and year industry predicted unemployment rates are 
constructed as follows:
19 Eight industries are used in the analysis based on a condensed version of the UK Standard Industrial 
Classification of Economic Activities, SIC (2007):“Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, energy and 
water supply”, “Manufacturing”, “Construction”, “Wholesale, retail & repair of motor vehicles, 
accommodation and food services”, “Transport and storage, Information and communication”, 
“Financial and insurance activities, Real estate activities, Professional, scientific & technical activities, 
Administrative &support services”, “Public admin and defense, social security, education, human 
health & social work activities”, “Other services”. The “industry unemployment rate” is defined as the 
unemployed by industry of last job as percentage of economically active by industry. 
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PredictedU nempghjt = SψghjkUNEMPghkt
k 
where ψghjk is the share of industry k among employed individuals of age group g, 
gender h, county j at baseline, and where UNEMPghkt is the unemployment rate, at the 
national level, in industry k for individuals of age group g, gender h and in time period 
t. Given that the predicted unemployment measure is a weighted average of the
national industry-specific unemployment rates, these weights reflect the baseline local 
industry composition in the relevant gender and age group. 
The IV approach has a number of attractive features. Most importantly, the 
estimates cannot be affected by contemporaneous omitted variables since the only 
local input into the predicted unemployment rates is the industry structure at baseline 
and these rates cannot be related to any contemporaneous (during the sample period) 
omitted variables. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, birth rates in a county are a 
function of both local labor supply and labor demand. It is for this reason that the use 
of observed changes in local labor market confounds the results. Instead, the IV uses 
labor demand shocks as an identifying source of variation and act as an exogenous 
change in local labor demand. Additionally, the predicted unemployment rate during 
the next period relies only on initial local industry composition and national-level 
industry-specific unemployment rates that influence the gender composition of 
employment opportunities. However, one might be concerned for the earlier time 
periods of the panel. Later in this paper, this issue is investigated by dropping some of 
the years at the beginning of the sample period from the estimated model. This 
estimation does not send any warning signals that the main results are substantially 
affected by underlying serial correlation in county-specific circumstances. 
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 OLS Specifications 
Table 3.2 presents the results from the OLS estimation. Column 1 reports the 
estimation with all fixed effects included; column 2 adds basic demographic 
characteristics (education, ethnicity, country of birth and partnership status) and an 
additional control variable (house prices); column 3 adds county-specific linear time 
trends; and column 4 adds age group-county-specific linear time trends. 
The specification in the first column yields a positive and statistically 
insignificant coefficient of 0.008. After adding more controls and time trends, the 
results consistently show that the overall unemployment rate is positively associated 
with fertility rates. To assess whether different age groups are more likely to move in 
response to an economic shock, I include age group-county-specific linear time trends 
in column 4. The coefficient of the main interest remains similar to the ones in columns 
1–3, implying that age groups do not systematically move into different counties in 
response to adverse labor market conditions. According to the estimate from the fully 
saturated model in column 4, a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate 
is associated with a 1.3% increase in birth rates, which is significant at the 1 % level. 
This finding suggests that fertility moves countercyclically, and, accordingly the 
substitution effect dominates any negative income effect over the sample period. The 
main reasons for this finding are twofold: On the LFP side, the difference between the 
LFP of men and women has shrunk considerably since the mid-1990s. On the earnings 
side, the gender pay gap has been following a downward trend.20 
20 More specifically, the LFP difference between men and women fell from 14.5% age points in 1994 
to 8.6 percentage points in the final quarter of 2011. In terms of the gender pay gap, based on median 
hourly earnings excluding overtime, it has narrowed for full-time employees, to 9.1% compared with 
17.4% in 1997. The gap for all employees has also followed a downward trend to 19.5 %, down from 
27.5% in 1997. In addition, Polachek and Xiang (2014) find that the pay gap in England is declining 
relatively more quickly than in other countries. 
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the rest of the analysis is carried out based on the specification in column 3, in which 
I control for observable demographic characteristics and house prices. I also exploit 
the panel aspects of the data by including county and year fixed effects as well as the 
county-specific linear time trends.  
The analysis continues with a stratification of the regressions with age-specific 
characteristics so as to gain further insight into the demographic basis of this result. 
The upper panel of Table 3.3 suggests that the fertility is the most responsive to 
unemployment rates between the ages of 25 and 34. In this age group, a 1 percentage 
point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a 1.32% increase in fertility. The 
incidence of youth unemployment also has a positive and marginally significant 
impact on fertility. The older group, 35–44, by contrast, shows no significant impact 
of unemployment on birth rates. Altogether, the results in this table suggest that age 
groups react differently when they are exposed to local unemployment shocks. The 
next table, therefore, proceeds to further examine the age group–gender 
characteristics. 
The differences between age- and gender-specific unemployment rates are 
highlighted in Table 3.4 in which I expect to find that female unemployment will be 
positively associated with fertility, whereas male unemployment will have the 
opposite impact. Overall, the results are in line with this notion. For example, a 1 
percentage point increase in female unemployment leads to a 1.29% increase in births 
for the prime age group. For men, the negative and significant effects are concentrated 
among the younger cohorts, 16–24 and 25–34. However, for the age group 35–44, 
there are insignificant coefficients on unemployment for both males and females. This 
finding could be because there is a weak relationship between older cohorts’ fertility 
decision and their labor market status. The following section of the paper is concerned 
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with endogeneity of unemployment, and IV estimation results are presented. 
3.4.2 IV Estimation 
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, the potential sources of bias in the OLS results are the 
possibility of reverse causality and/or some unobservables that are affecting fertility 
rates other than unemployment. I start by considering the full sample and estimate the 
effect of overall unemployment (aged 16–44) on fertility. Confirming the OLS 
findings in Table 3.2, columns 1–4, I find that the IV coefficients have the same sign; 
however, they are larger in magnitude. In the first stage, the predicted unemployment 
rates are significantly correlated with the endogenous variable and in the expected 
direction. Since the IV estimates can be interpreted as the impact of a fall in local labor 
demand on fertility, finding higher coefficients suggest that these estimates reflect the 
local spillovers in unemployment. In other words, they capture: (1) the main effect 
due to being unemployed, (2) the risk of being in unemployed in the near future and 
(3) expectations about future wage growth. 
In order to quantify the different effects of the predicted unemployment rate, I 
proceed to separately estimate the relationship across age groups and age group–
gender cohorts. In Table 3.3, the point estimates on age groups are all positive and 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Column 2, in bottom panel of Table 3.4, 
strongly confirms previous findings that male and female unemployment have 
different impacts on fertility and reveals the importance of sub-group characteristics. 
In parallel to the main hypothesis of this paper, the results imply that a one percentage 
point increase in male unemployment leads to a 2.18% decrease in birth rates whereas 
same amount of increase in female unemployment leads to a 6.26% increase in birth 
rates for the age group 25–34. This shows that the positive effect of female 
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unemployment on fertility is much larger for prime aged women. The results for men 
again show that unemployment has a significant negative effect on fertility, with the 
effect being stronger at later ages. Taken together, these results suggest that 
unemployment is an important determinant of fertility behavior. The following part of 
the results proceeds to explore whether the responses are homogenous across 
demographic characteristics. 
3.4.3 Analysis by Demographic Characteristics 
Having detailed information in UK LFS enables a filtering out of the effects of 
unemployment on fertility by education, country of birth and marital status. In order 
to allow the point estimates on county and year fixed effects to vary across subgroups, 
I construct covariates and estimate the relationship for each age group. In Table 3.5, 
columns 1–3 present estimates for the OLS specifications and columns 4–6 present 
estimates for the IV specifications. Because the cell size in industry employment 
composition by demographic characteristics is small at baseline, some IV estimates 
have lower number of observations. However, this does not cause excluded variables 
to show a weak partial correlation with unemployment. Although not reported due to 
space restrictions, the values for first-stage F-statistics are consistently higher than 10. 
Nonetheless, one caveat is that the measurement error of group-specific 
unemployment rates may lead to biased estimates, so these results should be 
interpreted with caution. 
Looking at the estimates presented by educational attainment in Panel (A) of 
Table 3.5, I find that the coefficients on unemployment are negative and significant 
for the 16–24 age group, but they are positive for older cohorts who are highly 
educated. In the further education category, unemployment also seems to be positively 
The Effects of Unemployment on Fertility: Evidence from England 
67 
associated with fertility. The fact that the effect is more pronounced on the degree 
level may be attributable to the fact that women take advantage of the low opportunity 
cost of childbearing to prevent future career interruption which occurs due to the 
transition to motherhood. The IV estimates again are larger in magnitude and tend in 
the same direction. 
Panel B shows results separately for UK-born and non-UK-born cohorts. 
Coefficients on unemployment for non-UK borns in both OLS and IV estimations are 
negative and mostly larger in magnitude. This result may be explained by the fact that 
immigrants are more sensitive to cyclical increases in unemployment than those of 
natives. For UK borns, the effects of unemployment on fertility tend to be positive. 
Turning now to the evidence on partnership in panel (C), I detect clear 
differences by marital status. Contrary to my expectations, I find that unemployment 
has an only negligible influence on fertility at younger ages, but it exhibits stronger 
association among older cohorts. Indeed, the coefficient of unemployment is negative 
and significantly different from zero for singles at more advanced ages. Looking at 
the results for married cohorts, unemployment is positively associated with fertility 
and the effect is mostly concentrated at the prime age cohort. 
3.4.4 Robustness Checks 
Additional robustness checks are conducted in order to detect whether the main 
findings remain stable to different specifications. The first column in Table 3.6 
presents results for teenage fertility. Results in the upper panel of column 1 indicate 
that unemployment has a positive and marginally significant impact on birth rates. As 
can be seen from the bottom panel, both male and female unemployment maintain the 
expected signs of direction. Although the effects are small in magnitude, the results 
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are still in line with the main findings of this paper. 
Between columns 2 and 4, I further discuss the important issue of the validity 
of my instrument, which is introduced in Section 3.4.2. The strong correlation of my 
instrument with the endogenous variable is apparent from all the first-stage results 
presented in Appendix Table 3.1. Although the IV results seem robust to a number of 
alternative specifications, one may argue that unemployment is not necessarily a 
purely demand-driven measure and is also affected by the changes in labor supply. 
Finally, I build on my instrument and use employment growth index as an alternative 
measure to assess the robustness of my results. The measure reflects exogenous labor 
demand for females and males in each age group and is constructed as follows: for 
each county, age group and year, I start with a variable measuring the proportion of 
employment based on local industry structure at baseline. Next, similar to Aizer 
(2010), I construct an annual employment growth index for each gender and age 
group, by interacting baseline measure with national trends in employment growth 
rates in industries dominant in the county, then collapsing over industries within each 
county– year–age group cell: 
EmpGrowthghjt = SψghjkEMPGROW THghkt
               k 
where ψghjk is the share of industry k among employed individuals of age 
group g, gender h, county j at baseline, and where EMPGROWTHghkt is the industry 
employment growth rate, at the national level, in industry k for individuals of age 
group g, gender h and in time period t. The first-stage results show that all measures 
of unemployment are well correlated with the instruments. On the whole, the IV 
estimates presented in Table 3.6 alleviate concerns about the biased estimates induced 
by the changes in labor supply and are consistent with the baseline results. 
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Reassuringly, I find that: (1) fertility moves counter-cyclically over the business cycle; 
(2) the prime age group is more responsive to changes in unemployment; (3) male 
unemployment is negatively and female unemployment is positively associated with 
births, with these effects often being smaller and mostly significant. Finally, the results 
introduced in columns 5–7 show that the outcome is not driven by the serial correlation 
and present estimates after dropping the first 4 years of the sample. Across all age 
groups, the coefficients consistently remain qualitatively unchanged. Taken  together, 
I obtain results that are very similar to the baseline estimates and provide meaningful 
insights on the countercyclical nature of births along with group-specific differences 
across social strata in England. 
3.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to assess the causal effect of unemployment on 
fertility in England and to evaluate how this effect varies across sub-demographic 
groups. Its main finding is that the substitution effect dominates the income effect at 
the aggregate level, implying a countercyclical fertility pattern that may be attributable 
to changes in female labor market outcomes over the sample period. Additionally, the 
relevance of gender-specific unemployment is clearly supported by the current 
findings and the results confirm the main predictions of dynamic fertility models. The 
findings indicate that female unemployment tends to increase fertility, as women take 
advantage of the low opportunity cost of childbearing in the form of mothers’ time. 
Male unemployment goes in the opposite direction, which implies an income effect. 
Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to 
state that a comparison of age groups reveals that unemployment is more likely to 
affect the fertility of younger cohorts, rather than older ones. A speculative reason for 
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this is the possibility that the former are more able to postpone their fertility until 
economic conditions recover, while labor market conditions may play a less important 
role for couples whose “fertile” lifetime is nearing its end. The expected variation in 
the unemployment and fertility relation by educational attainment, marital status and 
country of birth is also documented. Although the study has successfully demonstrated 
the aforementioned findings, it is however limited by the use of total birth rates, and 
the findings cannot be transferable to birth orders. Future research should therefore 
concentrate on the investigation of birth orders while considering demographic 
subgroup characteristics. 
All in all, the present study confirms previous findings and provides additional 
evidence suggesting the existence of strong variation across sub-demographic groups, 
while showing that different age groups and genders react differently to local 
unemployment shocks. 
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Figure 3.1: Mean Unemployment Rates and Birth Rates Across Counties 
Figure 3.2: Age-Specific Unemployment Rates and Fertility Rates 
The Effects of Unemployment on Fertility: Evidence from England 
72 
 Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Standard Deviation 
Birth Rates by Age Group 
Aged 16-24 48.69 8.705 
Aged 25-34 99.61 11.23 
Aged 35-44 27.74 7.689 
Unemployment by Age Group 
Aged 16-24 13.40 4.512 
Aged 25-34 5.772 5.314 
Aged 35-44 4.197 2.064 
Unemployment by Age Group & Gender 
Female Aged 16-24 11.46 4.450 
Female Aged 25-34 5.207 2.476 
Female Aged 35-44 3.961 1.861 
Male Aged 16-24 15.09 5.604 
Male Aged 25-34 5.922 3.582 
Male Aged 35-44 4.384 2.790 
Single 0.500 0.060 
Married 0.418 0.058 
Divorced/Widowed 0.082 0.014 
UK Born 0.910 0.071 
Non UK Born 0.090 0.043 
White 0.931 0.077 
Other Ethnicities 0.090 0.058 
Higher Education 0.238 0.061 
Further Education 0.245 0.028 
Compulsory Education or less 0.517 0.060 
House Prices £145,482 £112,045 
N 2,397 
Notes: The table provides within cell means for 47 counties used in the baseline 
specification. House prices are CPI adjusted to 2005 pounds. 
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  Table 3.2: Effect of Unemployment on Fertility - Alternative OLS & IV Specifications
(1) 
OLS 
(2) 
OLS 
(3) 
OLS 
(4) 
OLS 
(5) 
IV 
(6) 
IV 
(7) 
IV 
(8) 
IV 
Unemployment Rate 0.0085 0.0131*** 0.0141*** 0.0130*** 0.0110 0.0252*** 0.0266*** 0.0263*** 
(0.0060) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0074) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0071) 
Higher Education 0.0025 0.0026 0.0055 0.0002 0.0021 0.0045 
(0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
Further Education -0.0142*** -0.0153*** -0.0028 -0.0159*** -0.0160*** -0.0034* 
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Single 0.0053 0.0033 0.0029 0.0073** 0.0055 0.0036 
(0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0051) (0.0034) (0.0041) (0.0047) 
Non UK Born 0.0058 0.0101** 0.0202*** 0.0032 0.0091** 0.0182*** 
(0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0046) 
Other Ethnicities 0.0436*** 0.0517*** 0.0372*** 0.0372*** 0.0475*** 0.0349*** 
(0.0123) (0.0146) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0144) (0.0133) 
House Prices -0.0003 0.0005* 0.0006** 0.0003* 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 
(0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age Group Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Specific Trends No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
County-AgeGroup Trends No No No Yes No No No Yes 
N 2397 2397 2397 2397 2397 2397 2397 2397 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Robust standard errors in parentheses and clustered at age group-county level. Dependent variable: log fertility 
rate by year, age group and county. Fertility rates are constructed by dividing the number of births by the relevant female population using mid-year population that are based 
on censuses. House prices (10,000s) are CPI adjusted to 2005 pounds. Unemployment rates are calculated based on the ILO definition. All specifications are weighted by the total 
number of women in each cell.
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Table 3.3: Effect of Unemployment on Fertility - Age Group Specifications 
(1) (2) (3) 
Aged 16-24 Aged 25-34 Aged 35-44 
OLS OLS OLS 
Unemployment rate 0.0044*** 0.0132*** 0.0011 
(0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0019) 
IV IV IV 
Unemployment rate 0.0087*** 
(0.0018) 
0.0274*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0068*
(0.0031) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects 
County Specific Trends 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Demographic Controls 
House Prices 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
N 799 799 799 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see 
notes to Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.4: Effect of Unemployment on Fertility – Age Group-Gender Specifications 
(1) (2) (3) 
Aged 16-24 Aged 25-34 Aged 35-44 
OLS OLS OLS 
Male unemployment rate -0.0011*** -0.0089*** -0.0036 
(0.0003) (0.0029) (0.0054) 
Female unemployment rate 0.0044*** 0.0129*** 0.0038 
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0022) 
    IV      IV IV 
Male unemployment rate -0.0032*** -0.0218*** -0.0189 
(0.0011) (0.0067) (0.0116) 
Female unemployment rate 0.0099*** 0.0626*** 0.0483*** 
(0.0032) (0.0099) (0.0063) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects 
County Specific Trends 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Demographic Controls 
House Prices 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
N 799 799 799 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see 
notes to Table 3.2. 
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 Table 3.5: Effect of Unemployment on Fertility - Demographic Group Specifications 
(1) 
Aged 16-24 
(2) 
Aged 25-34 
(3) 
Aged 35-44 
(4) 
Aged 16-24 
(5) 
Aged 25-34 
(6) 
Aged 35-44 
(A) Education OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Degree level or above Unemp. Rate -0.0272*** 0.0111** 0.0027*** -0.0962*** 0.0438*** 0.0066** 
(0.0090) (0.0046) (0.0008) (0.0373) (0.0123) (0.0025) 
Further Education Unemp. Rate -0.0080** 0.0053** -0.0008 -0.0275** 0.0192* 0.0024 
(0.0029) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0108) (0.0086) (0.0081) 
Comp. Edu. or below Unemp. Rate -0.0052* 0.0056 0.0038* -0.0204** 0.0178* 0.0254 
(0.0025) (0.0036) (0.0018) (0.0086) (0.0086) (0.0161) 
N 750 750 750 750 750 750 
(B) Country of Birth OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
UK Born Unemp. Rate 0.0075*** 0.0111*** -0.0012 0.0177*** 0.0277*** 0.0107 
(0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0080) (0.0016) (0.0058) (0.0131) 
Non UK Born Unemp. Rate -0.0328*** -0.0088*** -0.0014** -0.0896*** -0.0249*** -0.0023** 
(0.0059) (0.0023) (0.0006) (0.0079) (0.0068) (0.0010) 
N 764 764 764 764 764 764 
(C) Marital Status OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV 
Single Unemp. Rate -0.0002 -0.0026*** -0.0031** 0.0006 -0.0037*** -0.0063*** 
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0021) 
Married Unemp. Rate 0.0001* 0.0054** 0.0003** 0.0003 0.0079*** 0.0017** 
(0.0000) (0.0020) (0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0029) (0.0006) 
N 799 799 799 799 799 799 
 Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 3.2. 
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 Table 3.6: Effect of Unemployment on Fertility – Robustness Checks 
(1) 
Pred. 
(2) 
Employment 
(3) 
Employment 
(4) 
Employment 
(5) 
Exclusion of 
(6) 
Exclusion of 
(7) 
Exclusion of 
Unemp. Growth Growth Growth Years 95-98 Years 95-98 Years 95-98 
Rates Index Index Index 
IV IV IV IV IV IV IV 
Unemployment Rate 
Aged 16-19 
0.0016* 
Aged 16-24 
0.0039*** 
Aged 25-34 
0.0109*** 
Aged 35-44 
-0.0012 
Aged 16-24 
0.0038** 
Aged 25-34 
0.0225*** 
Aged 35-44 
0.0042* 
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0033) (0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0068) (0.0020) 
Male Unemp. Rate -0.0002** -0.0040*** -0.0335*** -0.0008*** 0.0003** -0.0255*** -0.0006* 
(0.0001) (0.0009) (0.0106) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0093) (0.0003) 
Female Unemp. Rate 0.0011** 0.0066*** 0.0521*** -0.0012 0.0034*** 0.0499*** 0.0138** 
(0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0125) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0044) (0.0052) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Specific Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Demographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
House Prices Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 799 799 799 799 611 611 611 
 Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 3.2. 
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Chapter 4 
The Effects of House Prices on Birth Rates: 
New Evidence from England 
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4.1 Introduction 
The price changes in the housing market have been a much-debated topic in the United 
Kingdom over the past years. According to the Land Registry data, average house 
prices have increased by nearly 290 per cent between 1995 and 2013, from £67,000 to 
£234,000, in England with some counties experiencing a more than 900 per cent rise in 
house prices. Subsequently, these strong movements in the property market generated 
inevitable effects on households’ wealth and disposable income. For example, the British 
newspaper The Guardian reported in a recent (2015) article that: 
“Based on Land Registry and HMRC data, a homebuyer earning the median 
salary for their region in 1995 would have had to spend between 3.2 times and 4.4 times 
their salary on a house, depending on where they lived. In 2012-13, the median house 
price had risen to between 6.1 times and 12.2 times median regional incomes.” 
In 2013, The Telegraph, another British newspaper, argued that household 
consumption was sensitive to changes in housing wealth:  
“Rising house prices in many areas of the country are creating an opportunity 
for homeowners who are asset rich but cash poor to release equity from their homes.” 
In 2011, the BBC quoted the chief executive of the Shelter, a housing charity, 
who said:  
“We have become depressingly familiar with first-time buyers being priced out 
of the housing market, but the impact of unaffordable rents is more dramatic. With no 
cheaper alternative, ordinary people are forced to cut their spending on essentials like 
schools and families.” 
Lastly, in a brief article in 2007, the BBC cited a reader’s comment to reflect 
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the importance of the price and availability of housing on families: 
“House prices are currently the main obstacle to stable family life and stable 
parenting.” 
Indeed, this unique housing market structure, and its close link to household 
spending decisions, suggest a plausible connection between housing tenure and having 
children in England. In an attempt to unravel this relationship, I investigate how birth rates 
are affected by changes in house prices separately for home owners and renters through 
income and price effects. There are two ways of looking at this interaction. On the one 
hand, given that housing wealth is a major component of the household’s assets for 
home owners and empirically housing wealth and consumption tend to move in the same 
direction (for example, Campbell and Cocco, 2007; Case, Quigley and Shiller, 2005 & 
2011), an increase in house prices should lead to an increase in demand for children, if 
children are a normal good.1 For tenants, on the other hand, higher rent payments may 
force them to reduce their consumption in line with the increase in cost of housing and 
should generate a negative price effect on the demand for children. 
Despite the logical appeal of these arguments, to date there have been few studies 
that set out to present an analysis of this relationship. The current available evidence 
mainly comes from the United States (for example,  Lovenheim and Mumford, 2013; 
Dettling and Kearney, 2014) and from Hong Kong (Yi and Zhang, 2010).2 However, a 
further analysis is necessary as the housing market in England stands out in international 
1 Becker’s (1960) quality and quantity approach suggests that a rise in income may have depressing 
effects on birth rates if income elasticity for the number of children is considerably lower than that for 
quality of children. 
2 I do not review the fertility literature in detail here. For studies using US data, see Butz and Ward 
(1979), Currie and Schwandt (2014) and Schaller (2016). Studies using data from other countries 
include, among others: Adsera (2005), Ahn and Mira (2002), Aksoy (2016), Ozcan, Mayer and Luedicke 
(2010). See Sobotka, Vegard, and Philipov (2011) for a wider review of the earlier literature. 
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context. It is mainly because: (i) houses in England are overvalued, and the prices are 
among the highest in the world (Kuenzel and Bjørnbak, 2008); and (ii) prices exhibit 
extreme volatility – real house prices in England as a whole are substantially more 
volatile than in the most volatile metro areas in the United States (Hilber and 
Vermeulen, 2016); (iii) in terms of size, houses are substantially smaller than in the 
United States and any other European countries (Morgan and Cruickshank, 2014); (iv) 
house prices have risen faster than in any other OECD country and have far outstripped 
earnings growth (Hilber, 2015); and (v) private sector rents are the highest in Europe, 
and renters spend nearly 40 per cent of their income on paying their rent in comparison 
to the European average of 28 per cent (National Housing Federation, 2015). Therefore, 
special attention should be devoted to England as it exhibits different housing market 
characteristics than other countries. 
Another reason for concern is that some previous studies are subject to a possible 
endogeneity bias. For example, assuming that the housing supply is fixed in the short 
term, if people who plan to have a child and expand their families demand larger houses, 
then the direction of causation runs from birth rates to house prices. This implies a 
case of reverse causation. In addition, there are strong reasons to suspect that the existing 
studies suffer from omitted variable bias. Since house prices for dwelling units are 
determined by a number of factors, the failure to control for demand shifters that play a 
part in affecting house prices as well as birth rates may bias estimates of the house 
price-fertility rate nexus. For instance, holding all else equal, a rise in household liquid 
assets (that is, non-housing wealth) or one-person family formation, may potentially affect 
both constructs. In order to establish a causal relationship and be able to assess the 
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effect of house price on birth rates, I propose a clear identification strategy that takes 
the aforementioned factors into account. 
This paper extends the emerging literature on house prices and birth rates by using  
novel source of variation from England. More specifically, I exploit the regulatory 
constraints on the housing market by refusal rates for major development projects in 
English counties, which is generated by outdated planning regulations. The current 
planning system maintains many of the mechanisms introduced in the Town and Country 
Planning Act of 1947 which has been characterized as quite complex and inefficient, 
preventing new housing developments coming forward. This constrained housing sup- 
ply can be attributed to the lack of incentives of local authorities to respond to the 
planning permission applications in a positive and timely manner. There are several 
reasons put forward to explain how regulatory constraints can affect house prices. For 
example, Barker (2004) suggests that the housing supply in England does not respond 
to price signals, mostly because of the constraints embedded in the planning system. 
Rouwendal and Vermeulen (2007), and Saiz (2010) show that restrictions on land 
supply have negatively affected new housing construction despite the increases in house 
prices. Similarly, Hilber and Vermeulen (2016) argue that planning rules are particularly 
important in driving up house prices in England and have a substantive positive impact 
on the house price-earnings elasticity. 
In this paper, I use rich data sets of English counties spanning from 1996 to 
2014 to investigate the effects of house prices on birth rates. I first present OLS results 
of how fertility rates respond to increases in house prices, estimated separately for home 
owners and renters. To address omitted variables bias I (i) extensively control for 
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demographic characteristics, and (ii) take full advantage of the panel data structure by 
including county, year and age group fixed effects as well as county-specific linear and 
quadratic time trends. While the net effect of house prices on birth rates is negative, 
the OLS estimation establishes a strong positive relationship between house prices and 
fertility rates among home owners and a negative relationship among renters. 
The association between house prices and birth rates is stronger in supply constrained 
areas, especially in south-east England, including London. Moreover, results from the 
demographic subgroups and alternative house price measures analyses also confirm the 
main empirical findings. Lastly, the IV specifications yield coefficients that are larger 
in magnitude in which the fully saturated specification indicates that a 10 per cent 
increase in house prices is associated with 4.9 per cent fall in births among renters and 2.8 
per cent increase in births among home owners. At the mean ownership rate the net 
effect is negative and leads to a 1.3 per cent fall in births. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is three-fold. First, I provide 
evidence on the impact of house prices on fertility rates from a country with a highly 
restricted housing market, which has not been studied previously. These findings 
provide new evidence on how country-specific factors influence birth rates by showing 
the importance of housing market regulations. Second, I deal with the endogeneity of 
house prices in a robust manner and I exploit a novel source of variation, that is refusal 
rates for major development projects. This direct measure of planning restrictiveness 
makes a distinctive contribution to the literature and distinguishes the current study from 
previous papers which rely on survey data. Third, I carefully disentangle the impact of 
house prices from other factors and tackle the possible endogeneity of house prices with 
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respect to internal migration (that is, mobility) by accounting for net population 
changes for each county-year cell. The focus on England provides a distinct addition to 
the literature and this research will further our knowledge about an increasingly 
important and understudied socio-economic problem. 
The remaining part of the paper proceeds as follows: the next section discusses the
planning system and process in England. Section 4.3 introduces the data description and 
sources. The fourth section presents the empirical strategy and the fifth section presents 
the results. Lastly, section 4.6 offers a discussion and concludes. 
4.2 The Planning System and Process in England 
In 1947, the UK parliament legislated a bill called The Town and Country Planning Act 
which nationalized the right to develop land and established a new system, indicating 
that individual planning permission was needed from a local authority for all land 
development and housing projects. The legislation has continued to evolve on a 
number of occasions with the last major changes made in 2011, namely by the 
Localism Act (2011), in an attempt to move towards decentralized planning.3
The planning system delegates regional planning bodies (RPBs) to oversee 
land use and number of houses being built in England. In this centralized system, the 
RPBs decide the allocation of land and impose housing targets on local (planning) 
authorities through the five year plans (to avoid confusion, I will henceforth replace the 
3 Over the years, the planning system has undergone a number of major changes, the titles of which are as 
follows: Town and Country Planning Act (1990) introduced the concept of “plan-led development”, 
Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act (2004) initiated compulsory acquisition of land for development 
and other planning purposes, Planning Act (2008) aimed to accelerate the process for granting permissions 
for major new infrastructure projects such airports, roads, dams, energy facilities and so on. 
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term local (planning) authority by county).4 The local planning committees then allocate 
land use based on planning applications received. As outlined by the regulations, the 
standard process for obtaining planning permission is as follows. Upon receiving 
applications, the counties publicize the projects to start the formal consultation phase 
which lasts for at least three weeks. After this period, a county needs to decide within 8 
weeks for minor projects, for example household projects cases, and within 13 weeks 
for major development projects such as large housing sites.5 
However, granting planning permission is not as straightforward as it may 
seem. Despite the various alterations made over time, the regulatory framework is still 
identified as one of the main barriers to new housing supply (see Cheshire and Sheppard, 
2002; Barker, 2004 and 2006; Evans and Hartwich, 2005, Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016) 
and characterized by three main properties: ( i ) centralized land use approach and 
complications in determining the level of housing supply in counties; (ii) complex 
application process and under-resourced planning departments; (iii) the lack of financial 
incentives for counties to deliver essential infrastructure and amenities. 
Although the primary goal of the centralized system is to encourage the 
housing supply, this top-down system fails to take annual housing demand changes and 
associated price movements into account. Indeed, the Department of Communities and 
Local Government’s (DCLG) 2011 report suggests that regional strategies have 
antagonized local residents, setting them against development plans and housing targets. 
Such opposition is mainly driven by concerns that adequate public services (road, 
4 In England the local planning authorities are 32 London borough councils, 36 metropolitan borough 
councils, 201 non-metropolitan district councils, 55 unitary authority councils, the City of London 
Corporation and the Council of the Isles of Scilly. 
5 This time frame initiated by the Labour government in 2002 in order to shorten the processing time. 
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public transportation, hospital, schools and so on) will not be provided and house prices 
will be gradually eroded. Consequently, the planning authorities mainly focus on the 
interests of the local residents and tend to preserve the land from development, which 
distorts the local housing market equilibrium. 
Ineffectiveness of the current housing planning practices also arises from the fact 
that authorities do not have sufficient resources and planners (such as technical staff and 
legal services) to respond to the complex application process in a timely manner.6 For 
example, household projects and major development projects are subject to the same 
application procedure, one that often leaves too few resources available to properly 
evaluate the large-scale development applications. This, in turn, results in delays or 
refusal of submissions in order to meet targets set by the central system.7 Political 
concerns are also widely embedded in local level planning. Cambridge Centre for 
Housing and Planning Research (CCHPR) (2014) – commissioned by the DCLG – 
reports that elected members (that is councilors – representatives elected to a county) 
may refuse applications that planning officers have recommended for approval based 
on non-technical grounds.8 
Turning to the lack of financial incentives, counties are unwilling to support 
housing growth due to lack of funding for infrastructure provision. In the current 
system, the government uses different resources (such as census data, school 
6 In addition to the public consultation, local planning authorities have to consult a number of departments 
(for example the local highway authority, environment agency, English Heritage, health and safety 
executive and so on) who may be influenced by a proposed housing project. 
7 According to the Home Builders Federation, as of January 2015, more than 150,000 applications were 
waiting to advance from the "outline" planning stage to the "detailed" planning stage. 
8 Local councilors have a conclusive say in planning decisions made in their area. Each planning committee 
consists of local councilors who come from different political parties. When a committee makes a 
decision, councilors usually consider (though they are not lawfully obliged to do so) a recommendation 
report written by planning staff. Councilors may accept the recommendation directly or discuss the 
application further before deciding to accept or refuse the application. 
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enrollment and so on) to determine the amount of funding.9 However, these data 
sources are mainly backward-looking and are not updated annually. Consequently, the 
funding stream is not based on the actual needs of the local communities, and 
disadvantages counties that experience rapid housing growth (Barker, 2004). In other 
words, new housing developments impose a formidable fiscal burden on counties and the 
internalization of the associated cost by local residents.  
As briefly introduced above, the planning structure is not able to cope 
effectively with the house prices in response to changes in demand, causing a mismatch 
between the goals of the central system and those of local communities. I therefore 
propose to use refusal rates for major development projects to capture the effects of 
regulatory constraints on house prices. This serves as a “catch-all” variable and 
combines land scarcity, policy restrictiveness, and local land use policy measures. The 
advantages and disadvantages of this measure will be further discussed in the following 
section. 
4.3 Data 
The data used in this paper come from 
- the UK Land Registry 
- the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 
- the confidential version of the UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
- the Office for National Statistics (ONS) 
- the Family Resources Survey (FRS). 
9	The UK government uses the “four-block” model (the relative needs, the relative resource, the central 
allocation and the floor damping) to allocate funds to counties since 2006. The calculations mainly rely on 
demographic, economic and social data to define the share of revenue spending for each county given a 
fixed national total. This model also recognizes the differences in the amount of local income which 
individual counties have the potential to raise. The full details of the calculations can be found in the Local 
Government Finance Report which is published annually by parliament. 
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The level of analysis is age group-county-year cell and the details on how the 
balanced panel data was constructed are provided below. 
4.3.1 Data on House Prices and Birth Rates
I obtain house price index (HPI) data from the UK Land Registry over the period 1995- 
2013. This index is based on actual residential sales transactions and includes information 
on more than 24 million sales and uses over 7 million identified pairs to compile the 
index. More specifically, it takes the difference in prices between January 1995 and the 
last time sale price, then averages these changes at county level. In addition, it accounts 
for seasonality as well as depreciation or appreciation of properties 
over time and is designed for “like for like” evaluation between houses.  
It uses a sample size that is larger than all other data available and also has a 
number of other advantages.10 First the repeat sales method minimizes the concerns about 
unobserved heterogeneity in house prices through following the same property over time. 
Second the index includes all cash and mortgage transactions and third it is based on 
actual property transactions, in other words, it eliminates the bias that arises from 
mortgage valuation approvals (see Chandler and Disney, 2014). 
I obtained the decisions on major (residential) development projects data from 
the DCLG and constructed the refusal rates based on the following definition: the 
proportion of development projects with 10 or more dwellings that was refused by a 
planning authority. To construct the panel data, I matched counties and local planning 
10 The sample size in ONS, Nationwide and Halifax house price indices are considerably smaller. It is 
because they are solely based on mortgage lending and exclude cash transactions. Further information about 
the index can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/about-the-price-paid-data. 
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authorities based on 2001 borderlines. 
4.3.2 Time Variant County Characteristics, Homeownership Rates, and Birth 
Rates 
I control for a number of time-variant determinants of birth rates in my main specification. 
More specifically, for each county-age group-year cell, I control for gross weekly wages, 
unemployment rate, gross household assets excluding housing wealth, share of college 
graduates, share of foreign born population, share of other ethnicities, share of one-
person family, share of non-married individuals and net internal migration (that is, net 
change in population by a county in a given year).11 
I use the LFS to construct demographic characteristics, labour market controls 
and information on housing tenure. The LFS is a nationally representative survey of the 
whole population of the United Kingdom and the current sample size is about 41,000 
households for every quarter. The main advantage of the LFS in the current framework 
is that the low tier geographical classification allows for aggregation and matching the 
corresponding data at the local planning authority level. Mean home ownership rates 
are constructed for each age group-county cell and kept constant at baseline to 
minimize endogeneity concerns and to account for compositional changes over time. It 
is important to note that home ownership rates have remained largely unchanged over 
the sample period. 
Data on internal migration come from the ONS. It refers to residential moves 
11 The unemployment measure is based on the International Labor Organization (ILO) definition which 
outlines unemployment as all people who are without work but are nevertheless available for and seeking 
employment. Gross weekly wages are CPI adjusted and calculated for both males and females while 
excluding the weekly earnings less than £25 and more than £10,000 a week.
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between different geographic areas within England and provides the most complete 
components of change for the mid-year population series which are updated annually. In 
particular, I use net migration estimates that reflect the number of movements across 
counties and serve as a satisfactory explanation for sorting patterns in response to 
changes in house prices. 
The data on household (liquid) assets, including fixed term investments, are 
obtained from the Family Resources Survey (FRS). The FRS is a continuous survey of 
households. For each financial year (April to March) more than 20,000 private 
households are interviewed and the survey provides detailed information on the income 
resources and conditions of families in England. I use this information to disentangle 
any possible confounding effects of other types of wealth. 
The birth count data used in this analysis are from the ONS. These statistics include
counts of live births and stillbirths by mother’s area of usual residence and age group. 
Age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) are constructed for age bands 20-29 and 30-44 by 
dividing the number of births by the corresponding female population in a given 
county-age group-year cell. Because the data do not provide information to determine the 
date of conception, I matched the ASFRs with one year lagged, t-1, county level 
characteristics and house prices. Using all previously mentioned data, I have 5,624 age 
group-county-year observations. 
4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Trends 
In Table 4.A, I present descriptive statistics by age groups, 20-29 (column 1) and 30-44 
(column 2). The age groups differ from each other in a number of ways. For instance, 
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the fertility rate is higher for the age band 20-29, at around 90 births per 1,000 women. 
The same cohort also earns and saves less on average, is more likely to be un- 
employed and renting, and is less likely to live alone, be married and hold a university 
degree. Age band 30-44 on average earns and saves more, is less likely to be 
unemployed or renting and is more likely to live alone, be highly educated and married. 
With regards to the country of birth and ethnicity, there are almost no substantial 
differences between the two groups. 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show trends in age-specific fertility rates and house prices 
at the national level. The birth rate for those aged 20-29 appears to fluctuate strongly: 
it fell to 84 births per 1,000 women in 2002, and then reached their peak of 96 births 
in 2007 before sharply declining again. With regard to the 30-44 age band, birth rates 
follow a pro-cyclical trend and reached their highest point of 64 in 2008, sharply 
dropping until 2010 and rebounding afterwards. Overall, differences in demographic and 
labour market characteristics as well as trends highlight the importance of accounting for 
other factors that may confound the association between house prices and birth rates.
Table 4.B presents the means and standard deviations for house prices and 
refusal rates. In terms of house prices, a first look at the data shows that house prices 
vary greatly across regions. Over the sample period, the mean house price was £172,001 
with a standard deviation of £103,024 and considerably higher in the south, including 
Greater London, than in the rest of England. Table 4.B also reports the average 
refusal rates. Similar to house prices, the refusal rates exhibit a significant amount of 
variation across regions and are the highest in the south. 
Figure 4 .3 plots histograms of the share of refusal rates for each region over 
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the sample period in which the charts have been put on a common x-scale. 
Altogether, it suggests that refusal rates vary across regions independently of the price 
patterns. Figure 4.1 in the appendix plots the variation in refusal rate trends across 
regions. It shows that the trends are non-linear due to the onset of the financial crisis 
and some regions have experienced larger increases in refusal rates. Moreover, the 
regions that are large and exhibit substantial variation in shares appear to stand out 
sharply in terms of house prices. Lastly, Figure 4 .4 shows that weekly rents closely 
track movements in house prices. 
4.4 Estimation Methodology 
4.4.1 Empirical Strategy 
In order to identify the causal effects of house prices on current birth rates, it is vital to 
have a variable that is exogenous to birth rates and strongly correlated with county-level 
house prices. As introduced above, I use refusal rates for major development projects as 
a source of exogenous variation in house prices in England that successfully captures the 
regulatory and supply side constraints on the housing market. Similar to Dettling and 
Kearney (2014), the fully saturated model specification that I estimate is given by the 
equation: 
log(Birthcgt )  =  β0 + β1HPc(t−1) + β2HPc(t−1) ∗ Owncg + β3Owncg (1) 
+Xcg(t−1) + θc + δg + γt + γc(t−1) + εcgt
where c, g, and t index counties, age groups and years respectively. The data set consists of 
a balanced panel of 148 counties, two age groups (20-29 and 30-44) and each observed 
over from 1995 to 2013. Birthcgt is the log of the age- specific fertility rates for a 
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given county, age group and year. HPc(t-1) is the log of house price index and shows 
how an increase in house prices affects the relationship between house prices and fertility 
rates among renters and existing owners who might plan to move to a larger property 
with an additional child. HPc(t-1)*Owncg, house price index is interacted with a 
baseline measure of ownership rates (1995) and captures the relationship between house 
prices and fertility rates among home owners. 
Xcg(t-1) is a vector of control variables and has three main components: (i) labour 
market controls, (ii) demographic characteristics, (iii) non-housing wealth and net 
population change. First, to account for pro-cyclical variation in labour market outcomes, 
I include the unemployment rate and the natural log of average weekly gross household 
income. Second, to adjust for the effect of demographic structure on fertility rates I 
directly control for time varying observable demographic characteristics. These variables 
are as follows: share of non-UK born population, share of college graduates, share of 
non-white individuals, share of one-person family, share of non-married individuals 
and share of individuals who came to England less than a year ago. Third, I include net 
population change to account for potential sorting (that is, mobility) patterns. More 
specifically, migration can be expected to affect house prices from the demand side. 
Hence, it is included to improve precision and, if correlated with house prices, also to 
address potential omitted variable bias. The log of non-housing wealth disentangles the 
effect of the housing wealth from other possible confounding wealth effects. 
To account for other unobservable characteristics, I exploit the panel aspects 
of the data set. In particular, county fixed effect, θc , and age group fixed effect, δg, are 
included to minimize all variation in birth rates caused by factors that vary across counties 
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as well as age groups and are constant over time. Year fixed effects, γt , are included to 
eliminate the time variant macro-economic shocks that lead changes in fertility rates 
shared by all counties and age groups over time. County-specific linear and quadratic 
time trends, γc(t-1), remove variation in intra-county fertility rates caused by factors 
that are county specific over time. εcgt is the unobserved determinants of fertility. Standard 
errors are clustered at age group-county level and all regressions are weighted by the 
relevant female population in each cell. In fully saturated models, the birth rate-house 
price estimates are identified exploiting within-county variation in house prices in which 
county-specific time trends are expected to minimize the unobservable effects that may be 
correlated with other explanatory variables. 
4.4.2 Instrumentation Strategy 
The primary aim of this paper is to provide causal effects of house prices on fertility 
rates. However, there are inherent reverse causality and omitted variables bias issues if 
the above relation was estimated using OLS. For instance, if people who plan to have 
a child demand larger houses, this may eventually lead the direction of causation to run 
from birth rates to house prices. They may also be jointly affected by some omit-
ted factors. Furthermore, measurement error in house prices may cause attenuation 
bias. An alternative strategy that addresses these issues would be to use an 
instrumental variable that affects county level house prices yet are unrelated to fertility 
rates and to re-estimate equation (1) using 2SLS method.12 This method would be useful 
12 I perform 2SLS estimation following Balli and Sorensen (2013) to avoid a “forbidden regression” (see, 
Wooldridge 2002). To be specific, I estimate 2SLS structural-equation model with two instruments: 
refusalrate and refusalrate*ownership and use vce(robust) to account for heteroskedastic errors. 
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in establishing causal links. 
To find a valid instrument, I focus on one of the main factors that drives the 
house prices upwards in England: a restrictive planning system (Barker, 2006, DCLG 
2011, CCHPR 2014, Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). The regime is restrictive and mostly 
characterized by high refusal rates for (new) major development projects. It is defined 
as the fraction of housing projects with 10 or more dwellings that were rejected by a local 
planning authority and a commonly used measure to capture regulatory restrictiveness 
(Cheshire and Sheppard, 1989; Preston et al., 1996; Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016). 
Since there is a large time gap between planning approval and a dwelling being 
built, and to account for pro-cyclical changes in decisions owing to high housing 
demand, I use three-year moving average refusal rates (that is the three years leading up 
to the current period). This also allows me to use a more informative measure rather than 
concentrating on year-to-year variations which may not be able to fully capture the scope 
and functions of the planning system. I assume that the link between three-year moving 
average refusal rates for major development projects and county level house price trends 
would not have been systematically correlated with county level birth rates. There are 
three justifications for this identifying assumption. First, using moving averages helps to 
reduce potential endogeneity concerns arising from changes in refusal rates that are 
driven by the local demographic structure. It is mainly because these estimates cannot be 
affected by contemporaneous omitted variables. Second, it seems that the decisions on 
applications are more likely to be shaped by the central government. As discussed in 
section 2, the housing targets are exogenously determined and given to the counties by 
the RPBs leaving them little room for maneuver to cope successfully with the house 
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prices in response to changes in local housing demand. Third, targets are set by using 
backward-looking data, and hence should not be influenced by the current birth rates. 
Within this context, identification is achieved by an exclusion restriction that refusal rates 
for major development projects should affect birth rates only through supply induced 
variation in house prices. 
Empirically, the refusal rates are highly positively correlated with house prices 
over the sample period at the aggregate level. However, the main concern of whether 
refusal rates exogenously determine birth rates requires further investigation. One 
potential concern is that a more profitable real estate market may encourage developers 
to apply for more projects, leading to artificially high refusal rates in some counties. In 
this case, my instrument would be correlated with the second-stage residuals. Although 
including county and year fixed effects in the estimating equation should address this 
issue, I additionally examine the validity of my results by using alternative 
instruments: (i) change in project approval delay rate before and after the 2002 policy 
reform, (ii) baseline refusal rates in 1994, (iii) average refusal rates between 1995 and 
2013, and (iv) a different measure: the number of accepted dwellings over baseline 
housing stock, as an instrumental variable. This measure attempts to isolate the effects 
from the number of permissions asked. That is, if counties of the same size 
systematically grant the similar number of permissions with the different number of 
applications received (that is, high versus low), then refusal rates would be contaminated 
by the number of applications. In such a case, estimates would be both qualitatively and 
quantitatively different. It is worth noting that the results of these alternative measures 
are similar to the presented IV results, thus confirming the validity of the IV estimates.  
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4.5 Empirical Results 
This section presents three sets of results. I first show Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimates. I then focus on IV/2SLS results outlined in section 4.2. Lastly, I present 
findings for demographic subgroups and with different house price measures. 
 
4.5.1 OLS Estimates 
Table 4.1 presents the results from the OLS estimation where the dependent variable is the 
log of the age-specific fertility rate. I estimate models separately for the full sample in 
the top panel, for those aged 20-29 in the middle panel, and for those aged 30-44 in the 
bottom panel. Column 1 reports the estimation with all fixed effects included (county, 
year and age group); column 2 adds demographic characteristics and net change in 
population; column 3 adds labour market characteristics and gross household assets 
excluding housing wealth; column 4 adds county-specific linear time trends; column 5 
adds county-specific quadratic time trends. 
The HousePrice*OwnershipRate interaction coefficient in the first column 
yields a positive and statistically significant estimate of .002 and the House Price 
coefficient yields a negative and statistically significant estimate of -.011. More 
specifically, the coefficient on the former measure the estimated effect in the 
hypothetical case of only homeowners (that is, age group-year-county cell with a 
home ownership rate of 1) and the latter quantify the estimated effect in the 
hypothetical case of zero homeowners (that is, age group-year-county cell with a 
home ownership rate of 0). After adding more controls and time trends (columns 2 to 
5), the results consistently and significantly show that for home owners an increase in 
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house price is positively associated with birth rates whereas the opposite is true for 
renters. In the fully saturated model (column 5), the magnitude of the relationship 
indicates that a 10 per cent increase in house prices leads to a 0.8 per cent rise in 
fertility rates among home owners. For renters, the same amount of increase in the 
house prices causes a 1.7 per cent fall in the fertility rate. These results confirm 
Dettling and Kearney’s (2014) finding that house prices significantly and differently 
affect birth rates among home owners and renters. The net effect at the mean home 
ownership rate is negative, which suggests that birth rates move counter-cyclically and 
the negative price effect dominates the income effect in England. This finding is 
different than those found in the United States (Dettling and Kearney, 2014) and there 
are a number of possible explanations: first, it may be because of the adverse effects of a 
restrictive housing market on renters who spend around 50 per cent (as high as 70 per 
cent in London) of their gross disposable income on rent.13 Second, house prices have 
risen much faster than earnings which has made getting onto the property ladder even 
harder for the average first-time buyer. Third, unlike the United States, the rental cost 
has closely tracked movements in house prices while earnings have remained relatively 
stable, subsequently leading to a fall in disposable income. Fourth, young families, who 
are mostly renters, have been priced out of the rental markets and rental accommodation 
has become unaffordable. Altogether, these factors can potentially create barriers to 
family formation and make having children financially “prohibitive” for renters, leading 
to a fall in birth rates at the aggregate level over the sample period. 
In the middle and bottom panel of Table 4.1, I show that the negative price effect 
																																								 																				
13	Author’s own calculation from the English Housing Survey, 2013-2014. 
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among renters is  mainly driven by those aged 20-29. In contrast, the positive effect of 
house prices on birth rates is driven primarily by the older cohort (those aged 30-44), in 
which people are significantly more likely to be home owners and less likely to postpone 
their childbearing. These findings support the notion that housing costs exert downward 
pressure on the fertility outcome of young adults and that there is a connection between 
getting on the property ladder and building a family. 
Regarding the other variables listed in Table 4.2 in the Appendix, unemployment 
rate and non-housing wealth positively and significantly affect the birth rates. The 
coefficient on gross weekly wages is also positive but insignificant in all models. Recall 
that I included net population change in an attempt to account for mobility and, hence, 
expected to see positive coefficients. Indeed, the positive and significant point estimates 
suggest that the variable does a good job in addressing the sorting issue in response to 
changes in house prices. Inclusion of county-specific time trends makes the coefficients 
larger both for home owners and for renters. This implies that the county-specific 
fertility trends driven by the omitted fertility determinants tend to move in the opposite 
direction of the trends in house prices over the sample period.14	
The analysis continues with a stratification of the regressions with county level 
housing supply characteristics so as to gain further insights into the housing market 
basis of this result. More specifically, I split the sample by the observations in the upper 
quartile of home ownership distribution and versus the ones in the lower quartile. The 
first two columns of Table 4.3 suggest that the fertility rate is the most responsive to 
house price changes in more supply constrained counties where ownership rate is 
																																								 																				
14 Inclusion of ownership-county specific and age group-county specific linear time trends made little 
difference to the values in column 5. 
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above the 75th percentile. In these counties, a 10 per cent increase in house prices leads to 
a 1.2 per cent increase in birth rates among home owners and a 2.3 per cent decrease in 
birth rates among renters. It is mainly because the supply shortage leads to higher house 
prices, generating a larger income effect for home owners and a larger negative price 
effect for renters.  In areas where home ownership rate sits at the bottom quartile, 
coefficients are smaller in magnitude and mostly significant at the conventional levels. 
Altogether, the results in this table suggest that the effects are more pronounced and 
seem to be driven by supply constrained counties.  
The differences across demographic groups are highlighted in Table 4.4 in 
which I expect to find that non-native, less educated and non-white groups to be “more” 
affected by increases in house prices. Overall, the estimates are parallel to this 
notion. For example, a 10 per cent increase in house prices leads to a 2.3 per cent 
decrease among the foreign born population. For home owners, the same amount of 
increase is associated with 1.6 per cent in birth rates. Overall, similar to the findings in 
Table 4.1, renters between the ages of 20 and 29 seem to be more negatively affected 
than the older cohort. On the one hand, may be because this cohort witnessed 
substantially higher rises in rents, they earn less on average and are less likely to borrow to 
finance their child-related expenses. On the other hand, the significantly higher coefficient 
on house prices and birth rates among the older cohort may suggest that this cohort benefits 
from the long-standing real house price growth. In other groups, the results maintain the 
expected sign of direction while being significant in most cases. The following section 
of this paper is concerned with endogeneity of house prices and instrumental variable 
estimation results are presented. 
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4.5.2 IV Estimates 
 
In this section I present the IV estimates of the house price-fertility relationship using 
county level refusal rates for major development projects as an instrument for county-
level house prices. As previously discussed in section 4.2, if the estimates suffer from 
omitted variables that are not picked up by the linear trends and the fixed effects, the 
OLS specifications will yield biased point estimates. In addition, if high fertility rates 
lead to a rise in housing demand and, in turn, increase house prices, the OLS 
results will provide wrong statistical inference. 
Before discussing the instrumental variable estimates, a discussion on the validity 
and power of the instrument is needed. Table 4.1 in the appendix presents the first stage 
estimates of the instrument and successively adds more controls in the models similar to 
Table 4.1. In all specifications, the first-stage relationship between refusal rate and house 
prices is strongly positive: three-year moving average refusal rates are significantly 
associated with house price growth at the 1 per cent level (column 1 in Appendix Table 
4.1), and this relationship is robust to the inclusion of demographic and labour market 
controls (columns 2 and 3) as well as county-specific time trends (columns 4 and 5). 
Overall, the instrument seems to exert stronger positive effects on house prices as more 
controls are included and have predictive power. Recall that refusal rates are used to 
capture the restrictiveness of the planning system and higher refusal rates typically lead to 
increases in house prices. It is an expected outcome, since the planning system in 
England tends to be protective. The results for the first stage F-test also show that the 
first-stage relationships are fairly strong. 
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In addition, I employ alternative measures for the instrumental variable, 
including the change in the approval delay rate (before and after the 2002 reform) of 
major residential projects (that is, the number of decisions that are delayed over 13 
weeks in any given county-year cell relative to all decisions made in that county-year 
cell), baseline refusal rates in 1994, average refusal rates between 1995 and 2013 
and the number of accepted dwellings over baseline housing stock. The change in 
t he  delay rate measure uses the exogenous variation generated by the policy reform 
introduced in 2002 to shorten the length of the planning application process.15 The 
point estimates at the first stage are positive as expected and mostly statistically 
significant (these models not shown). However, the first-stage F-tests in some cases 
are less than 10, so results with alternative measures should be interpreted with 
caution.16 
Table 4.2 presents the IV estimates in which I replicate the OLS specifications 
from Table 4.1. Again, I only report the coefficients of main interest. The IV-2SLS fixed- 
effects framework results show that: (i) the impact of house prices on birth rates among 
home owners is positive and significant at 1 per cent confidence, with a point estimate of 
0.028 (standard error 0.008 in column 5 of Table 4.2), (ii) the impact of house prices on 
birth rates among renters is negative and significant at 1 per cent confidence, with a point 
estimate of 0.049 (standard error 0.016 in column 5 of Table 4.2). Overall, in each model, 
the IV coefficients are larger than the OLS estimates. The OLS point estimates range 
from 0.2 per cent to 0.8 per cent for home owners and from 1.1 per cent to 1.7 per cent 
for renters. The corresponding interval for the IV results range from 0.6 per cent to 2.8 
per cent for home owners and 2 per cent to 4.9 per cent for renters. 
15 I thank Christian Hilber for suggesting I use the delay rate as an alternative instrument and his 
generosity in sharing these data. The merits of this measure have been discussed at length by Hilber and 
Vermeulen (2016). 
16 See Table 4.3 in the Appendix. 
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In the middle and bottom panels of Table 4.2, I report the estimates by age 
groups, following the baseline specification. I document important differences in 
these models. Both in the middle and bottom panels, I find the usual pattern that 
home owners’ birth rates respond positively to house price increases, whereas the 
opposite is true for renters. However, the middle panel columns for those aged 20-29 
show that the negative effect of house prices on renters’ birth rate is much larger than 
those implied by the older age group. In contrast, the results for those aged 30-44 
show that the overall housing wealth effects are larger than those found in the 20-29 
age band, and the home owner results in the top panel are mainly driven by the older 
age group.  Altogether, these findings suggest that the causal relationship between 
house prices and birth rates holds for both home owners/renters and among those aged 
20-29 and 30-44. 
Table 4.3 presents results based on the housing supply constraints.  In general,  
the pattern remains similar to the OLS findings. Column 3 presents results for the counties 
with “low ownership rate” in which the IV results are almost three times larger than the 
OLS estimates and significant at conventional levels. For the counties with high 
ownership rate, in column 4, the IV results are also substantially larger and also 
significant at 1 per cent. 
However, the IV results for the demographic groups are not so strong. First 
stage values of the F test for triple interactions are less 10 than in below degree level 
estimates. Therefore, the OLS estimates may be preferable to IV estimates for these 
categories. Other estimates are significant at conventional levels and the effects of house 
prices on birth rates are even stronger than those from the OLS regressions for both home 
owners and renters. In particular, the coefficients on the foreign born and other 
ethnicity interactions exceed the OLS estimate considerably, indicating that these groups 
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are the most affected. The following part of the results explore whether the responses 
remain robust to alternative housing price measures. 
4.5.3 Robustness Checks	
The results presented thus far demonstrate the fact that house price is an important 
determinant of the fertility rate outcome. Even though the effects vary with estimation 
features of the model, an increase in house price clearly has a positive impact on birth 
rates among home owners and has a negative impact on birth rates among renters. 
Nevertheless, I conduct additional analyses in order to detect whether the main findings 
remain stable to the different measures of the house prices, namely, median house prices, 
lower quartile house prices and lagged house prices – that is (t-2) and (t-3) –. In fact, the 
results mostly hold through columns 1 to 3 and 5 to 7 of Table 4.5. For the median and 
lower quartile house prices, the magnitude of the point estimates is similar to those
found in the main OLS and IV specifications. When I use the lagged house prices, the 
effects get smaller and become insignificant at higher lags. Nevertheless, the results are 
still in line with the main findings of this paper. 
Table 4.6 investigates birth rate differences when splitting the sample by region 
(that is, based on mother’s area of usual residence) in which I observe quite a distinctive 
pattern for birth rates. Prior work has reported that local scarcity of open developable land 
is the greatest in south east England and this region-based analysis may contribute to the 
understanding of the house prices and fertility relationship (Hilber & Vermeulen, 2016). 
While there are many differences between (Greater) London and the rest of England, 
one of the most noticeable in this context is that house prices are likely to exert stronger 
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effects on birth rates in London due to high variation in property prices and rents. I find in 
column 7 of Table 4.6 that the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is positive 
in sign, considerably larger in magnitude (compared with the main specification) and 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. In contrast, in column 7, estimates show that 
renters in London experience a considerably low fertility rate, and again this effect is 
much larger than the baseline results. For southern England (excluding Greater 
London), I estimate sizable effects for both home owners and renters, though the 
coefficients are smaller than those documented for London. Results for the east and west 
Midlands return evidence that house prices do not significantly affect birth rates in these 
regions. There is, however, evidence from columns 1 to 3 about significant effects of 
house prices on birth rates in the northern part of the country. These region-based 
findings are particularly noteworthy, because they provide supportive evidence for the 
validity of the main argument of this paper and confirm the causal link between house 
prices and birth rates. In addition, the region estimates somewhat indicate that the main 
results are mostly driven by the regions in southern England including Greater 
London.17 
Table 4.7 presents further results by housing boom and bust periods from the 
fully saturated OLS and IV specifications. I find that the impact of house prices on 
fertility rates is larger during “boom” years. Table 4.8 examines house price effects with 
additional controls. In column 1, I reprint the full sample IV estimates, columns 2-5 
show the results of including alternative housing market controls (share of first time 
buyers at the regional level, share of two or more bedroom apartments at the regional 
																																								 																				
17 I do not report region results by age groups for the sake of space. Overall, these estimates are mostly in 
line with those reported in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
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level, share of new dwellings at the regional level, and number of transactions (sales) at 
the county level) individually. Table 4.8 indicates that the coefficients on the birth rates 
are largely invariant to the inclusion of additional housing market characteristics, with 
no exception. I also estimated models in combination with each other and house prices 
interacted with the regional level controls, and these did not fundamentally change the 
main findings.18 
4.6 Conclusion 
Using the refusal rates for major development projects as an instrumental variable for 
house prices, the results presented in this paper show that house prices significantly 
affect birth rates in England. I found a significant positive birth rate coefficient for home 
owners and a significant negative birth rate coefficient for renters. There are also 
significant effects for younger (aged 20-29) and older (30-44) home owners and renters. 
The positive “home owner” effect is mainly driven by those aged 30-44 and the negative 
“renter” effect is driven by those aged 20-29.  At the aggregate level the net effect is 
negative, in other words the negative price effect dominates the income effect. The 
expected variation in house prices and fertility by demographic characteristics is also 
documented. 
The stronger effects of house prices found in the models where the sample was 
separated according to the residency in London and counties exhibit high ownership 
rate. The results for foreign-born population and those with a less than degree level 
education are also particularly large in magnitude. Moreover, the findings do not depend 
on the estimation methodology used, even though I do find relatively larger coefficients 
18 These results are not presented in the current tables but are available upon request. 
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when I instrument for county-level house prices. 
The stronger effects of house prices found in the models where the sample 
separated by the residency in London and counties exhibit high ownership rate. The 
results for foreign-born population and those with less than degree level education are 
also particularly large in magnitude. Moreover, the findings do not depend on the 
estimation methodology used, even though I do find relatively larger coefficients when I 
instrument for county level house prices. 
I also find similar results when I use different measures of house prices. In both 
OLS and IV results I find evidence that the median and lower quartile house prices 
significantly affect birth rates. This finding, again, is reproduced when I instrument for 
house prices. For the lagged house prices, the results indicate that house prices have a 
significant impact on fertility rates. However, the point estimates attenuate towards zero 
at higher lags. These findings for the different length of lags cast an important behavioral 
interpretation of the fertility responses to housing market trends. That is, people seem to 
take house price changes in previous years into account. 
The findings of this study are potentially important from a public policy 
standpoint: if the negative effect of house prices on fertility rates is mainly driven by the 
younger cohort (that is, couples put off having children because of not being able to 
afford suitable accommodation), it may be possible to reverse this trend through the 
design of better housing and/or child benefit schemes. One example would be to scrap 
the Help-to-Buy ISA’s maximum purchase cap of £250,000 and £450,000 for London. 
This cap limits couples to buy two or more-bedroom family homes and creates a barrier 
for young potential first-time buyers. If such government schemes help people to not 
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only get a foot on the housing ladder but also afford buying a family home rather than a 
flat, they could decrease the number of households with children renting privately and 
reduce the average age of the first-time mother. I offer these suggestions with a cautionary 
reminder that further individual level analysis and careful case studies are necessary to 
explain the causal mechanism and to design more effective policy responses. 
Lastly, although the study has successfully demonstrated the aforementioned 
findings, it is however limited by the use of total birth rates, and the findings cannot 
be transferable to birth orders and comment on the quality-quantity trade-off.  Future 
research should, therefore, concentrate on the investigation of birth orders and the 
potential relationship between house prices and the quality of children. 
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Figure 4.1: Age-Specific Fertility Rates (aged 20-29) and House Prices 
Figure 4.2: Age-Specific Fertility Rates (aged 30-44) and House Prices 
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Figure 4.3: Shares of Refusal Rates across Regions	
Figure 4.4: Rents and House Prices 
The Effects of House Prices on Fertility: New Evidence from England 
111 
Notes: Within cell means (standard deviations). The table provides within cell means for the age-
specific demographic characteristics for the 148 counties used in the analysis. Fertility rates are 
constructed by dividing the number of births by the corresponding female population using mid-year 
population estimates based on censuses, in which female ages range between 20 and 44. Source for 
county level birth data is UK Office for National Statistics. The UK Labour Force Survey is being used 
to construct county-year-age group specific unemployment rates, gross weekly wages and demographic 
characteristics. The gross weekly wages are calculated by dividing self-reported gross annual pay by the 
number of weeks worked in the same calendar year and are CPI adjusted to 2005 pounds. 
Unemployment rates refer to the per centage of economically active people who are unemployed by 
ILO standards. Household assets are self-reported and exclude housing wealth	
Table 4.A: Descriptive Characteristics 
Variables Aged 20-29 Aged 30-44 
Fertility Rate (1000s) 90.06 (22.83) 55.47 (21.26) 
Home Ownership Rate 54.49 (15.81) 69.88 (12.46) 
Home Ownership Rate (1995) 60.21 (14.18) 73.87 (11.34) 
Gross Weekly Wages 333.67 (122.66) 518.47 (203.66) 
Unemployment Rate 9.48 (5.14) 5.32 (3.21) 
Gross Household Liquid Assets 3,463 (2,998) 5,687 (4,781) 
Degree Level 27.62 (11.47) 31.05 (12.10 
A Level 27.72 (7.35) 20.25 (5.49) 
Below A Level 44.66 (11.31) 48.70 (10.33) 
Foreign Born 14.64 (14.02) 16.28 (15.70) 
Other Ethnicities 13.65 (15.19) 12.95 (14.77) 
One Person Family 7.94 (4.39) 10.41 (4.29) 
Single 77.97 (8.45) 28.11 (9.41) 
N 2812 2812 
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 Table 4.B: Descriptive Characteristics 
Regions House Prices House Price Index Refusal Rate Net Population Change 
North East 82,593 (30,750) 150.68 (57.48) 17.35 (12.63) 178 (190) 
North West 86,628 (35,749) 161.02 (60.44) 17.70 (10.83) 502 (1898) 
Yorkshire and the Humber 88,102 (37,969) 157.75 (61.29) 19.15 (11.14) 1454 (2169) 
East Midlands 101,340 (43,747) 180.30 (66.53) 21.75 (12.92) 3075 (2565) 
West Midlands 103,408 (43,567) 171.93 (61.13) 21.64 (14.53) 1361 (2310) 
East of England 122,050  (51,059) 205.57 (76.21) 24.32 (16.54) 4176 (3486) 
Greater London 237,185 (128,183) 259.37 (110.70) 31.60 (20.63) 2404 (2263) 
South East 154,706 (66,743) 216.42 (80.01) 34.34 (15.98) 2280 (3140) 
 South West 131,603 (52,734) 213.40 (82.16) 25.57 (13.91) 2242 (1915) 
Notes: Within cell means (standard deviations). This table provides aggregate level variables averaged across 9 regions (148 counties) and 19 
years (1995-2013) used in the analysis. Land Registry data on House Prices and House Price Index are based on reports from the individual 
house price records of all residential property sales in England. Data on Refusal Rates for Major Development Projects are obtained from the 
Department of Communities and Local Government. It is defined as the proportion of housing projects consisting of at least 10 dwellings that 
was refused by a local planning authority in one calendar year. Net Population Change data come from the Office for National Statistics – 
Population Estimates Unit and provide detailed information on the components of population change for counties, London boroughs and 
districts in England. According to the ONS (2015), the estimated resident population of an area includes all those people who usually live 
there, regardless of nationality.  Arriving international migrants are included in the usually resident population if they remain in England for at 
least a year. Emigrants are excluded if they remain outside England for at least a year, which is consistent with the United Nations definition 
of a long-term migrant.  Armed forces stationed outside of England are excluded.  Students are taken to be usually resident at their term time 
address. Internal migration flows presented in the table reflect the number of movements that cross local authority boundaries. 
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Table 4.1: House Prices and Birth Rates – OLS Estimations	
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Robust standard errors, clustered at the age group-county level, are in parentheses. Column 1 includes: age, 
year and county fixed effects, column 2 adds: share of non-UK born population, share of college graduates, share of non-white individuals, share of one-person family, share of non-
married individuals, share of households with at least one child and share of individuals who came to England less than a year ago and net population change, column 3 adds: 
unemployment rate, the average weekly gross household income and non-housing wealth, column 4 adds: county linear time trends and column 5 adds: county quadratic time trends.  
Controls for è 
(1) 
OLS 
Fixed effects 
(2) 
OLS 
+ demographic 
characteristics  
(3) 
OLS 
+ labor market 
characteristics 
(4) 
OLS 
+ county linear trends 
(5) 
OLS 
+ county quadratic trends 
Full sample 
HPI*Ownership 0.002*** 
(0.000) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
House Price(HPI) -0.011*** 
(0.002) 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
-0.013*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019** 
(0.007) 
-0.017*** 
(0.004) 
R-squared 0.303 0.489 0.578 0.704 0.816 
N 5624 5624 5624 5624 5624 
Aged 20-29 
HPI*Ownership 0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
House Price(HPI) -0.014*** 
(0.004) 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.018*** 
(0.005) 
-0.024*** 
(0.007) 
-0.020*** 
(0.005) 
R-squared 0.298 0.454 0.608 0.704 0.803 
N 2812 2812 2812 2812 2812 
Aged 30-44 
HPI*Ownership 0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.003) 
House Price(HPI) -0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.004*
(0.002) 
-0.003**
(0.001) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
R-squared 0.343 0.466 0.661 0.713 0.835 
N 2812 2812 2812 2812 2812 
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   Table 4.2: House Prices and Birth Rates – IV/2SLS Estimations 
 Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 4.1.  
Controls for è 
(1) 
IV 
Fixed effects 
(2) 
IV 
+ demographic 
characteristics  
(3) 
IV 
+ labor market 
characteristics 
(4) 
IV 
+ county linear trends 
(5) 
IV 
+ county quadratic trends 
Full sample 
HPI*Ownership 0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.014** 
(0.006) 
0.023** 
(0.008) 
0.026** 
(0.010) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
House Price(HPI) -0.020*** 
(0.006) 
-0.028*** 
(0.009) 
-0.035*** 
(0.011) 
-0.043*** 
(0.014) 
-0.049*** 
(0.016) 
R-squared 0.298 0.439 0.517 0.710 0.802 
N 5624 5624 5624 5624 5624 
Aged 20-29 
HPI*Ownership 0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.008** 
(0.003) 
0.016** 
(0.007) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
House Price(HPI) -0.030*** 
(0.009) 
-0.037*** 
(0.012) 
-0.044*** 
(0.013) 
-0.051*** 
(0.016) 
-0.062*** 
(0.019) 
R-squared 0.363 0.496 0.562 0.704 0.819 
N 2812 2812 2812 2812 2812 
Aged 30-44 
HPI*Ownership 0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.020*** 
(0.006) 
0.030** 
(0.012) 
0.034*** 
(0.010) 
0.036*** 
(0.011) 
House Price(HPI) -0.008 
(0.005) 
-0.013***
(0.004) 
-0.014***
(0.004) 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
-0.021*** 
(0.007) 
R-squared 0.383 0.488 0.601 0.744 0.825 
N 2812 2812 2812 2812 2812 
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 Table 4.3: House Prices and Birth Rates – High vs. Low Ownership Rates 
(1) 
OLS 
Low Ownership 
(25th Per centile) 
(2) 
OLS 
High Ownership 
(75th Per centile) 
(3) 
IV 
Low Ownership 
(25th Per centile) 
(4) 
IV 
High Ownership 
(75th Per centile) 
Full sample 
HPI*Ownership 0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
House Price(HPI) -0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.023*** 
(0.006) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.064*** 
(0.021) 
R-squared 0.758 0.777 0.813 0.828 
N 1406 1406 1406 1406 
Aged 20-29 
HPI*Ownership 0.007 
(0.012) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.029** 
(0.012) 
0.052*** 
(0.014) 
House Price(HPI) -0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.031** 
(0.011) 
-0.036** 
(0.015) 
-0.091*** 
(0.028) 
R-squared 0.764 0.782 0.833 0.835 
N 1406 1406 1406 1406 
Aged 30-44 
HPI*Ownership 0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.021***
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.069*** 
(0.020) 
House Price(HPI) -0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.040*** 
(0.012) 
R-squared 0.742 0.798 0.799 0.823 
N 1406 1406 1406 1406 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, 
see notes to Table 4.1.   
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Table 4.4: House Prices and Birth Rates – Various Interactions 
(1) 
Full Sample 
OLS 
(2) 
Full Sample 
IV 
(3) 
Aged 20-29 
OLS 
(4) 
Aged 20-29 
IV 
(5) 
Aged 30-44 
OLS 
(6) 
Aged 30-44 
IV 
HPI*Ownership*Foreign-born 0.016* 
(0.007) 
0.038* 
(0.020) 
0.008* 
(0.003) 
0.044*** 
(0.017) 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.048* 
(0.020) 
House Price(HPI)*Foreign-born -0.023** 
(0.010) 
-0.072** 
(0.031) 
-0.030*** 
(0.007) 
-0.085*** 
(0.018) 
-0.018** 
(0.003) 
-0.032** 
(0.012) 
R-squared 0.713 0.748 0.799 0.801 0.756 0.813 
N 5624 5624 2812 2812 2812 2812 
HPI*Alevelorbelow 0.005* 
(0.002) 
0.023 
(0.013) 
0.003 
(0.008) 
0.014 
(0.022) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.051* 
(0.023) 
House Price(HPI)*Alevelorbelow -0.018** 
(0.007) 
-0.051** 
(0.018) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
-0.036** 
(0.013) 
-0.021** 
(0.004) 
-0.056* 
(0.026) 
R-squared 0.778 0.743 0.796 0.825 0.788 0.802 
N 5624 5624 2812 2812 2812 2812 
HPI*Ownership*OtherEthnicities 0.004 
(0.004) 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
0.009** 
(0.003) 
0.018** 
(0.008) 
0.004** 
(0.001) 
0.019*** 
(0.005) 
House Price(HPI)*OtherEthnicities -0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.016* 
(0.008) 
-0.049** 
(0.020) 
-0.013* 
(0.005) 
-0.012* 
(0.006) 
R-squared 0.746 0.788 0.754 0.810 0.780 0.804 
N 5624 5624 2812 2812 2812 2812 
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 4.1. 
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      Table 4.5: House Prices and Birth Rates – Alternative House Price Measures 
        Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 4.1. 
(1) 
OLS 
Median House 
Prices 
(2) 
OLS 
Lower Quartile 
House Prices 
(3) 
OLS 
Average House 
Price, t-2 
(4) 
OLS 
Average House 
Prices, t-3 
(5) 
IV 
Median House 
Prices 
(6) 
IV 
Lower Quartile 
House Prices 
(7) 
IV 
Average House 
Price, t-2 
(8) 
IV 
Average House 
Prices, t-3 
Full Sample 
HPI*Ownership 0.011* 
(0.005) 
0.003* 
(0.001) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.017) 
0.023* 
(0.012) 
0.014** 
(0.005) 
0.012* 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.025) 
House Price(HPI) -0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.008* 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.040*** 
(0.013) 
-0.041*** 
(0.013) 
-0.022** 
(0.008) 
-0.016 
(0.018) 
R-squared 0.802 0.788 0.765 0.741 0.813 0.788 0.772 0.766 
N 5624 5624 5328 5032 5624 5624 5328 5032 
Aged 20-29 
HPI*Ownership 0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.010) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.019* 
(0.010) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.013) 
House Price(HPI) -0.025** 
(0.010) 
-0.014** 
(0.005) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.070*** 
(0.019) 
-0.033** 
(0.013) 
-0.013 
(0.010) 
-0.010 
(0.015) 
R-squared 0.798 0.777 0.801 0.765 0.757 0.794 0.786 0.731 
N 2812 2812 2664 2516 2812 2812 2664 2516 
Aged 30-44 
HPI*Ownership 0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.016*** 
(0.005) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.038** 
(0.014) 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
0.029** 
(0.012) 
0.011 
(0.012) 
House Price(HPI) -0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
-0.018* 
(0.009) 
-0.019*** 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
R-squared 0.813 0.801 0.801 0.743 0.813 0.743 0.779 0.745 
N 2812 2812 2664 2516 2812 2812 2664 2516 
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 Table 4.6: House Prices and Birth Rates – by Regions 
    Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 4.1. 
  Regions è                    
(1) 
North East 
(2) 
North West 
(3) 
Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
(4) 
East Midlands 
(5) 
West Midlands 
(6) 
East of 
England 
(7) 
Greater 
London 
(8) 
South East 
(9) 
South West 
OLS 
HPI*Ownership 0.007* 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
0.007** 
(0.002) 
0.016 
(0.018) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.017*** 
(0.005) 
0.012*** 
(0.003) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
House Price(HPI) -0.004** 
(0.001) 
-0.016** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.015) 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.031*** 
(0.009) 
-0.022*** 
(0.005) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
R-squared 0.786 0.752 0.744 0.756 0.778 0.772 0.789 0.769 0.790 
N 456 836 570 342 532 380 1216 722 570 
IV 
HPI*Ownership 0.018 
(0.013) 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
0.018* 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
0.022 
(0.027) 
0.037*** 
(0.010) 
0.040*** 
(0.013) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
House Price(HPI) -0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.054** 
(0.021) 
-0.010 
(0.032) 
-0.014 
(0.012) 
-0.021 
(0.036) 
-0.059** 
(0.018) 
-0.071*** 
(0.022) 
-0.049*** 
(0.015) 
-0.028*** 
(0.008) 
R-squared 0.802 0.767 0.765 0.771 0.745 0.761 0.802 0.804 0.810 
N 456 836 570 342 532 380 1216 722 570 
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            Table 4.7: House Prices and Birth Rates –Boom and Bust Periods 
(1) 
IV 
Baseline Estimate 
(Table 4.2, Column 5) 
(2) 
OLS 
Housing Boom 
1995-2008 & 2012-2013 (inc.) 
(3) 
OLS 
Housing Bust 
2009-2011 (inc.) 
(4) 
IV 
Housing Boom 
1995-2008 & 2012-2013 (inc.) 
(5) 
IV 
Housing Bust 
2009-2011  (inc.) 
Full sample 
HPI*Ownership 0.028*** 
(0.008) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
0.013* 
(0.006) 
House Price(HPI) -0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.022*** 
(0.007) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.056*** 
(0.018) 
-0.015** 
(0.006) 
R-squared 0.802 0.758 0.747 0.766 0.734 
N 5624 4736 888 4736 888 
Aged 20-29 
HPI*Ownership 0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
House Price(HPI) -0.062*** 
(0.019) 
-0.021*** 
(0.006) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.050*** 
(0.015) 
-0.021** 
(0.008) 
R-squared 0.819 0.763 0.735 0.774 0.724 
N 2812 2368 444 2368 444 
Aged 30-44 
HPI*Ownership 0.036*** 
(0.011) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.008*
(0.004) 
0.035*** 
(0.009) 
0.016** 
(0.006) 
House Price(HPI) -0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.007* 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.024*** 
(0.007) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
R-squared 0.825 0.772 0.730 0.780 0.733 
N 2812 2368 444 2368 444 
               Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.8: House Prices on Birth Rates – Alternative Controls 
 Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 4.1. 
(1) 
IV 
Baseline Estimate 
(Table 4.2, Column 5) 
(2) 
IV 
Baseline Estimate 
+ Share of First Time 
Buyers (Regional 
Level) 
(3) 
IV 
Baseline Estimate 
+ Share of Two or More 
Bedroom Apartments 
(Regional Level) 
(4) 
IV 
Baseline Estimate 
+ Share of New 
Dwellings (Regional 
Level) 
(5) 
IV 
Baseline Estimate 
+ Number of 
Transactions (County 
Level) 
Full Sample 
HPI*Ownership 0.028*** 
(0.008) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
0.018** 
(0.007) 
0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.023** 
(0.008) 
House Price(HPI) -0.049*** 
(0.016) 
-0.051*** 
(0.017) 
-0.043*** 
(0.014) 
-0.055*** 
(0.016) 
-0.042*** 
(0.013) 
R-squared 0.802 0.805 0.811 0.809 0.813 
N 5624 5624 5624 5624 5624 
Aged 20-29 
HPI*Ownership 0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.018* 
(0.008) 
0.015* 
(0.007) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.013** 
(0.005) 
House Price(HPI) -0.062*** 
(0.019) 
-0.054*** 
(0.016) 
-0.050*** 
(0.015) 
-0.060*** 
(0.018) 
-0.058*** 
(0.019) 
R-squared 0.819 0.827 0.830 0.829 0.835 
N 2812 2812 2812 2812 2812 
Aged 30-44 
HPI*Ownership 0.036*** 
(0.011) 
0.029*** 
(0.009) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.039*** 
(0.013) 
0.030** 
(0.012) 
House Price(HPI) -0.021*** 
(0.007) 
-0.018*** 
(0.005) 
-0.025*** 
(0.008) 
-0.024** 
(0.010) 
-0.019** 
(0.008) 
R-squared 0.825 0.815 0.820 0.818 0.816 
N 2812 2812 2812 2812 2812 
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Appendix Table 2.1 
Descriptive Characteristics – Demographics (among those with earnings information) 
2012-2014 UK Integrated Household Surveys 
Variables DK/Refuse/Other response to sexual orientation question, males 
DK/Refuse/Other response to sexual orientation 
question, females 
Age 44.05 (10.40) 43.70 (10.36) 
Degree level 0.319 (0.466) 0.317 (0.465) 
Higher ed. 0.114 (0.318) 0.127 (0.333) 
A level 0.231 (0.421) 0.181 (0.385) 
O level 0.215 (0.411) 0.271 (0.444) 
White 0.892 (0.310) 0.904 (0.294) 
Partnered 0.721 (0.449) 0.647 (0.478) 
Any Child <16 0.296 (0.456) 0.305 (0.461) 
England 0.749 (0.434) 0.747 (0.435) 
London 0.111 (0.314) 0.111 (0.314) 
N. Ireland & Wales & Scotland 0.251 (0.434) 0.253 (0.435) 
Avg. Weekly Earnings 662.70 (806.20) 422.20 (312.70) 
Full-time worker 0.925 (0.264) 0.640 (0.480) 
Sample Size 7,020 7,469 
 Weighted means (standard deviations). 
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Appendix Table 2.2 
Sexual Orientation and Any Employment 
UK IHS 2012-2014, Adults age 25+ 
Males Females 
Controls for è 
(1) 
Sexual orientation  + year 
dummies 
(2) 
+ demographic characteristics 
(age, race, education, any 
kids, residence) + year 
dummies 
(3) 
Sexual orientation + year 
dummies 
(4) 
+ demographic characteristics 
(age, race, education, any 
kids, residence) + year 
dummies 
All 
Gay/Lesbian 0.026*** 
(0.012) 
-0.026** 
(0.011) 
0.085*** 
(0.015) 
-0.028* 
(0.015) 
Bisexual -0.103*** 
(0.032) 
-0.114*** 
(0.030) 
-0.071*** 
(0.022) 
-0.078*** 
(0.020) 
R-squared 0.001 0.153 0.001 0.155 
N 121206 121206 175285 175285 
Non-partnered 
Gay/Lesbian 0.107*** 
(0.017) 
0.014 
(0.016) 
0.013 
(0.031) 
-0.098*** 
(0.030) 
Bisexual -0.078* 
(0.045) 
-0.124*** 
(0.042) 
-0.125*** 
(0.040) 
-0.180*** 
(0.035) 
R-squared 0.003 0.171 0.002 0.169 
N 39508 39508 62650 62650 
Partnered 
Gay/Lesbian 0.022 
(0.016) 
-0.043*** 
(0.015) 
0.122*** 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.015) 
Bisexual -0.003 
(0.040) 
-0.010 
(0.037) 
-0.047* 
(0.026) 
-0.032 
(0.024) 
R-squared 0.001 0.157 0.001 0.156 
N 81698 81698 112635 112635 
  See notes to Table 3. 
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Appendix Table 2.3 
Expanded set of Coefficient Estimates, Fully Saturated Model 
(i.e., Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2.3) 2012-2014 UK Integrated Household Surveys 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Non-partnered 
males 
Partnered males Non-partnered 
females 
Partnered females 
Gay -0.006 -0.050* 0.029 0.067*** 
(0.025) (0.028) (0.037) (0.025) 
Bisexual -0.110 -0.189*** -0.097* -0.009 
(0.068) (0.057) (0.050) (0.040) 
Other -0.049 -0.015 -0.053 0.015 
(0.063) (0.049) (0.063) (0.060) 
Refused 0.043** 0.033** 0.026 0.017 
(0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
S.O. Nonresponse -0.155*** -0.010 -0.090*** 0.006 
(0.045) (0.012) (0.031) (0.018) 
Age 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.051*** 0.059*** 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age-squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Degree Level 0.561*** 0.606*** 0.708*** 0.665*** 
(0.016) (0.010) (0.020) (0.017) 
Higher Ed. 0.391*** 0.403*** 0.454*** 0.366*** 
(0.019) (0.012) (0.021) (0.018) 
A Level 0.250*** 0.283*** 0.291*** 0.209*** 
(0.016) (0.010) (0.021) (0.017) 
O Level 0.099*** 0.144*** 0.170*** 0.114*** 
(0.016) (0.011) (0.020) (0.017) 
Face to Face -0.010 -0.035*** -0.009 -0.028*** 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) 
Ethnicity Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Location Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Family Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 19905 55112 22385 36836 
R2 0.189 0.191 0.247 0.224 
  See notes to Table 2.3. 
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Appendix Table 2.4 
Sexual Orientation and Log Earnings, Sensitivity to Job Controls 
UK IHS 2012-2014, Adults age 25+ with full-time employment, males 
         Controls for è 
(1) 
Sexual orientation 
only + basic + 
family (i.e., 
baseline 
specification) 
(2) 
Sexual orientation 
only + basic + 
family + only 
private sector 
cont. 
(3) 
Sexual orientation 
only + basic + 
family + only 
establishment size 
cont.  
(4) 
Sexual orientation 
only + basic + 
family + only 
industry cont.  
(5) 
Sexual orientation 
only + basic + 
family + only  
occupation cont. 
(6) 
(all but occ. cont.) 
Sexual orientation 
only + basic + family 
+ private sector + 
establishment size + 
industry controls 
All males 
Gay -0.027 
(0.019) 
-0.024 
 (0.019) 
-0.028 
(0.018) 
-0.009 
(0.018) 
-0.017 
(0.018) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
Bisexual -0.149*** 
(0.032) 
-0.150*** 
(0.044) 
-0.145*** 
(0.044) 
-0.141*** 
(0.043) 
-0.147*** 
(0.041) 
-0.138*** 
(0.043) 
R-squared 0.198 0.199 0.217 0.220 0.257 0.238 
N 75017 75017 75017 75017 75017 75017 
Non-partnered males 
Gay -0.006 
(0.025) 
-0.004 
 (0.025) 
-0.010 
(0.025) 
0.011 
(0.024) 
-0.000 
(0.023) 
0.009 
(0.024) 
Bisexual -0.110 
(0.068) 
-0.112* 
(0.068) 
-0.099 
(0.067) 
-0.096 
(0.065) 
-0.117* 
(0.063) 
-0.089 
(0.065) 
R-squared 0.189 0.189 0.207 0.215 0.254 0.230 
N 19905 19905 19905 19905 19905 19905 
Partnered males 
Gay -0.050* 
(0.028) 
-0.047* 
(0.028) 
-0.047* 
(0.027) 
-0.031
(0.028) 
-0.038
(0.027) 
-0.026
(0.027) 
Bisexual -0.189*** 
(0.057) 
-0.186*** 
 (0.058) 
-0.191*** 
 (0.057) 
0.184*** 
 (0.057) 
-0.176*** 
 (0.053) 
-0.184*** 
 (0.057) 
R-squared 0.191 0.192 0.212 0.212 0.249 0.232 
N 55112 55112 55112 55112 55112 55112 
 See notes to Table 2.3. 
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Appendix Table 2.5 
Sexual Orientation and Log Earnings, Sensitivity to Job Controls 
UK IHS 2012-2014, Adults age 25+ with full-time employment, females 
         Controls for è 
(1) 
Sexual orientation 
only + basic + 
family (i.e., 
baseline 
specification) 
(2) 
Sexual orientation 
only + basic + 
family + only 
private sector 
cont. 
(3) 
Sexual orientation 
only + basic + 
family + only 
establishment size 
cont.  
(4) 
Sexual orientation 
only + basic + 
family + only 
industry cont.  
(5) 
Sexual orientation 
only + basic + 
family + only  
occupation cont. 
(6) 
(all but occ. cont.) 
Sexual orientation 
only + basic + family 
+ private sector + 
establishment size + 
industry controls 
All females 
Lesbian 0.054*** 
(0.021) 
0.053** 
 (0.021) 
0.048** 
(0.020) 
0.056*** 
(0.020) 
0.079*** 
(0.019) 
0.050** 
(0.020) 
Bisexual -0.036 
(0.032) 
-0.035 
(0.032) 
-0.030 
(0.032) 
-0.033 
(0.032) 
-0.028 
(0.029) 
-0.026 
(0.032) 
R-squared 0.231 0.232 0.259 0.259 0.369 0.285 
N 59221 59221 59221 59221 59221 59221 
Non-partnered females 
Lesbian 0.028 
(0.037) 
0.028 
 (0.037) 
0.029 
(0.036) 
0.038 
(0.036) 
0.074** 
(0.033) 
0.038 
(0.035) 
Bisexual -0.096* 
(0.050) 
-0.092* 
(0.050) 
-0.077 
(0.051) 
-0.112** 
(0.047) 
-0.078* 
(0.045) 
-0.086* 
(0.049) 
R-squared 0.247 0.248 0.275 0.280 0.383 0.306 
N 22385 22385 22385 22385 22385 22385 
Partnered females 
Lesbian 0.068*** 
(0.025) 
0.066*** 
(0.025) 
0.058** 
(0.025) 
0.068***
(0.025) 
0.083***
(0.023) 
0.058**
(0.025) 
Bisexual -0.009 
(0.041) 
-0.010 
 (0.041) 
-0.010 
 (0.041) 
0.000 
 (0.040) 
-0.008 
 (0.037) 
-0.001 
 (0.040) 
R-squared 0.223 0.224 0.251 0.248 0.362 0.274 
N 36836 36836 36836 36836 36836 36836 
  See notes to Table 2.3. 
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Appendix Figure 3.1: Share of Each Industry Across Counties 
Appendix Figure 3.2: Industry Composition Across Age Groups 
Notes: Industry 1: Agriculture Industry 2: Manufacturing Industry 3: Construction Industry 4: 
Distribution/Hotel/ Restaurant Industry 5: Transport and Communications Industry 6: 
Banking/Finance/Insurance Industry 7: Public Administration/Education/Health Industry 8: Other Services 
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  Appendix Table 3.1: First-stage Estimations 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Aged 16-44 Aged 16-24 Aged 25-34 Aged 35-44 
First Stage First Stage First Stage First Stage 
Predicted Unemployment 
Rate 1.094
***
1.107
***
0.0995
***
1.042
***
(0.0333) (0.0388) (0.0226) (0.0229) 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Age Group Fixed Effects Yes No No No 
County-Age Group Trends Yes No No No 
County Specific Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2397 799 799 799 
1st  Stage R2 0.901 0.764 0.836 0.809 
1st Stage F Statistic 29.60 24.52 51.32 54.91 
  Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 3.2. 
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Appendix Figure 4.1: Variation in Refusal Rates across Regions 
   Appendix Figure 4.2: Refusal Rates and House Prices by Regions 
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   Appendix Figure 4.3: Housing Wealth and Household Wealth	
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       Appendix Table 4.1: First-Stage Regressions of Refusal Rates on County Level House Prices 
            Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 1. 
Controls for è 
(1) 
FS 
Fixed effects 
(2) 
FS 
+ demographic 
characteristics 
(3) 
FS 
+ labor market 
characteristics 
(4) 
FS 
+ county linear 
trends 
(5) 
FS 
+ county 
quadratic 
trends 
3 Year MA Refusal Rates 0.038*** 
(0.008) 
0.046** 
(0.018) 
0.044*** 
(0.013) 
0.053*** 
(0.017) 
0.050*** 
(0.015) 
First Stage R-squared 0.402 0.455 0.466 0.703 0.826 
F Statistic 12.02 11.70 13.83 15.65 18.46 
N 5624 5624 5624 5624 5624 
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Appendix Table 4.2: Expanded set of Coefficient Estimates, (i.e., Column 5 of Table 4.1) 
 (1) (2) 
 OLS IV 
HPI*Ownership 0.008** 0.028*** 
 (0.002) (0.008) 
House Price(HPI) -0.017*** -0.049*** 
 (0.004) (0.016) 
Gross Weekly Wages ct-1 0.001 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.010) 
Unemployment Rate ct-1 0.012** 0.020* 
 (0.004) (0.009) 
Gross Household Assets ct-1  0.023*** 0.039** 
 (0.007) (0.016) 
Degree Level ct-1 -0.009* -0.023* 
 (0.004) (0.012) 
Foreign Born ct-1 0.001 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Other Ethnicities ct-1 0.006 0.008 
 (0.006) (0.010) 
One Person Family ct-1 -0.008 -0.012 
 (0.008) (0.019) 
Single ct-1 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.007) 
Net Population Change ct-1 0.012** 0.032** 
 (0.004) (0.013) 
 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
County Specific Time Trends Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.816 0.802 
N 5624 5624 
 Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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      Appendix Table 4.3: House Prices and Birth Rates – Alternative IV/2SLS Estimations 
  Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  For details on control variables, see notes to Table 1.   
	
	
                              
             Instruments è 
(1) 
Change in Delay 
Rate 
(2) 
Average Refusal 
Rates between 1995-
2013  
(3) 
Refusal Rates in 
1994 
(4) 
Change in Delay 
Rate*Refusal Rates  
(5) 
The number of accepted 
dwellings over baseline 
housing stock 
Full sample      
HPI*Ownership 0.035** 
(0.013) 
0.024* 
(0.015) 
0.019 
(0.010) 
0.032*** 
(0.010) 
0.017* 
(0.008) 
House Price(HPI) -0.053** 
(0.020) 
-0.045** 
(0.018) 
-0.039* 
(0.019) 
-0.049*** 
(0.015) 
-0.036** 
(0.014) 
      
R-squared 0.822 0.777 0.781 0.801 0.768 
N 5624 5624 5624 5624 5624 
First stage  F Statistic 12.05 9.78 7.82 13.56 8.55 
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